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MODERNIZING MARRIAGE
Adam Candeub*
Mae Kuykendall**
This Article proposes to modernize the archaic procedures states use to authorize
marriages so as to provide legal flexibility, promote efficiency, and enhance indi-
vidual choice. Almost universally, states require couples' presence within their
borders, however briefly, for a ceremony. After considering the historical and policy
rationales for this requirement and finding them either obsolete or incoherent, we
propose that states offer marriages to those outside their borders. Such distance
marriages could occur via video-conference, using the internet or even telephone,
with readily available safeguards to prevent fraud. This simple reform would al-
low certain couples who cannot marry under local law to import the trappings of
an official marriage ceremony in "real time, " as well as assure access to the legal
tie for any couple facing a barrier of physical separation. Our proposal builds up-
on the historical and present-day precedent of proxy marriage and legal principles
such as choice of law for multi-jurisdictional contracts and corporate formation.
With this reform, states would be free to compete over marriage procedure efficiency
and experiment with alternative regulatory goals or menu options, such as ena-
bling greater disclosure about personal or health histories, permitting more
restrictive prenuptial arrangements (as with certain states' development of "cove-
nant marriage") or tying access to certain distance marriages to advance
agreement to accept jurisdiction for marriage dissolution. Finally, our proposal
would allow same-sex couples (and other couples unable to marry under their
home jurisdictions' laws) easier access to marriage authorization and the ability to
perform wedding ceremonies before family and friends. Our procedural reform of-
fers a gradualist approach to the controversies concerning the substantive rules of
marriage, notably Judge Walker's recent ruling declaring Proposition 8 unconsti-
tutional.
* Adam Candeub is an Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law.
** Mae Kuykendall is a Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
When Iowa courts held that the state must accord equal mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples, the courts awarded Iowans a new
right and simultaneously handed a same-sex destination wedding
trade to Iowa merchants. The day marriage rights became official,
same-sex couples flocked to the Hawkeye State by the busload to
marry. After brief stays, the newly married couples boarded the
buses and returned to their homes. Such short visits, supplement-
ed by a burgeoning wedding trade in chapels, food, and flowers,
continue, to the delight of many Iowans and the consternation of
others.' The five other state jurisdictions, plus the District of Co-
lumbia, that authorize such unions are also a tourist destination for
* 5
marrying couples.
These trips illustrate two points, one about law and the other
about human behavior: (i) nearly every state requires the physical
1. A note for the record: we posted our first draft of this Article on SSRN on October
22, 2009, and announced a project to encourage states to adopt distance marriage proce-
dures, drawing on the precedent of proxy marriage. An article appeared on SSRN on April
28, 2010, that also drew on the scholarship on proxy marriage that we had compiled, con-
tained certain of the same themes about population mobility and other matters, and used
several of the same illustrations and examples. The author acknowledged having reviewed
our Article before presenting her article at a faculty workshop that occurred four months
after we posted our draft Article. The author described developing an interest in the subject
from a news story published one month before our posting. The article cited an interview
broadcast on National Public Radio about our project and gave an implausibly tangential see
also cite to our Article. Given the sequence of posting of the articles and the duplication of a
certain amount of our research, we do not regard her article as appropriate for citation. We
feel constrained to include this note to explain why we do not cite the article and to place
on the record for any reader of both articles the facts about the prior posting of our Article
and the admitted review of our Article by the person who prepared the second piece.
2. SeeVarnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
3. See, eg., Jane Greer, Nine Same-Sex UU Couples Marry in Iowa, UUWORLD.ORG (Sept
21, 2009), http://www.uuworld.org/news/articles/150927.shtml.
4. Recent statistics reveal that more than half of the same-sex couples marrying in
Iowa are from out of state. Jason Hancock King, Iowa Has Become Gay Marriage Mecca, IowA
INDEP. (May 20, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://iowaindependent.com/34495/king-iowa-has-
become-gay-marriage-mecca (more than half the 2000 marriage licenses issued to gay cou-
ples in Iowa went to out-of-state residents).
5. The other states and jurisdictions that authorize same-sex marriages are Connecticut,
the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont. A study by the Wil-
liams Institute at UCLA estimated that more than 16% of same-sex couples were married "but
lived in a state with no recognition." GARY J. BATES, WILLIAMs INsT., SAME-SEX COUPLES IN
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU DATA: WHO GErs COUNTED AND WuY 1 (2010), available at
http://www2.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/pdf/WhoGetsCounted.FORMATTEDl.pdf. Pre-
sumably, most such couples traveled to an authorizing state to marry. In addition, the Gates
data show higher estimates for same-sex couples in New York and Maryland. JODY HERMAN,
CRAIG KoNNom & M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS INST., THE IMPACT ON RHODE ISLAND'S
BUDGET OF ALLOwING SAME-SEX COUPLES To MARRY 5 (2011), available at
http://www2.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/pdf/WilliamsistituteRIiscalAnalysis.pdf.
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presence of a couple within its territory in order to authorize the
couple's marriage; and, (ii) couples value the status and ceremony
of marriage even if it lacks legal force in their home state. These points
suggest a major reform to the law of marriage procedure. States
should authorize marriages of those not present within their terri-
torial boundaries. We demonstrate that states have the sovereign
power to authorize marriage performed anywhere,6 and historically
have blessed marriages in distant locations. As to their incentives to
provide such benefits outside the state to non-residents, states
have, to varying degrees, aspirational goals relating to good gov-
ernment, reputational interests in being innovators, and motives
relating to fee income.
The societal benefit of states' adopting such legal regimes is
straightforward and immediate. All couples would gain more as-
sured access to the marriage status. In our mobile society, the need
for improved access is diverse and widespread. Among those bene-
fited would be couples seeking to secure military survivor benefits,8
those traveling to "destination marriages" in exotic places who dis-
trust the efficiency of the local marriage recording system, and
older couples separated and too ill to travel. Same-sex couples in
particular would gain low-cost access to the value that they place on
officially authorized marriage, and would be able to import the
ceremony to their home state even if the home state will not recognize
such marriages. The value such couples see in being married," as
6. We refer to marriages contracted across jurisdictions, or with the parties in sepa-
rate locations, as "distance," "absentee," or "remote" marriages. These terms have been
variously used in writings cited herein about marriage and communication in shareholders'
meetings from a distance.
7. We do not suggest in this Article a proposal for a more robust incentive of the kind
incorporation provides in the continuing taxing and fee connection between a corporation
and the state in which it is incorporated. For a proposal concerning property regimes, in
which property owners would deliver payments to states by registering out-of-state property
in their former state's property regime and paying fees and even taxes, see Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 104 (2005).
8. The need for access to marriage by couples separated due to military service is
greater than ever, given long deployments and assignments abroad. See Monu Bedi, E-
Marriage and the Military, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011). According to Professor
Monu Bedi, over the last few years, deployments have increased in length and some military
members have been involuntarily extended on active duty. Id. Professor Bedi infers that
these members will have a greater need for long distance marriage since they won't be home
as often. Id. He buttresses this conclusion by emphasizing an increase of dual military mar-
riages. Id. The pressure for distance marriage has resulted in an occasional marriage by
Skype, even without a specific statutory basis. Clare Kennedy, Marine in Iraq Gets Hitched over
the Internet, MILITARYTIMES.COM (July 8, 2009, 5:40 PM), http://www.militarytimes.com/
news/2009/06/ap-marineweddingjiraq_060809/.
9. Our working paper, posted on SSRN as noted supra note 1, helped to give a male
Texas couple the confidence to arrange a marriage beamed by Skype from Washington, D.C.
to a W Hotel in Dallas, Texas. The couple has attested eloquently to the emotional impact of
737
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shown by the bus trips to Iowa, would be greatly enhanced by ex-
periencing their marriage ceremony among friends and family in
their home state. Law, then, has some simple uses, such as offering
unfettered access to, as the economists would say, "status goods"
that the state uniquely can provide.'o
These immediate gains for individual couples are important, but
our proposal goes further. After demonstrating that a tie to geog-
raphy has limited prudential purpose or effect, we call for opening
up marriage procedure to cross-jurisdictional competition and
hence encouraging a basic reappraisal of the regulatory goals of
marriage formation rules. We propose a new approach to marriage
procedure that uses federalism to promote convenience as well as
enhance individuals' and states' interest in informed choice. This
reform renders marriage formation very similar to incorporation-
or choice of law provisions in contracts-in that they create legal
relationships among individuals who are not physically present
within the authorizing jurisdiction. While recognizing key differ-
ences between marriage and incorporation, we argue for
scrutinizing marriage law, and protecting the associational interests
involved, under the same justifications which modem scholars
have scrutinized incorporation, i.e., efficiency, disclosure, and ju-
risdictional competition.
The recent district court decision declaring Proposition 8 un-
constitutional" highlights the potential usefulness of the corporate
analogy. Judge Walker's decision emphasized the norm of equality
as a mandate for all state laws, which risks judicial imposition of
one solution for the entire country to the problem of modernizing
marriage. The genius of corporate law" is that it harnesses the ca-
pacity of federalism to spread improved law consonant with the
needs of capital. States have been at liberty to try differing ap-
proaches, to copy one another, and to offer improvements to
businesses in all states. 3 State laws fashioned in one state thus ben-
efit interests in all states, while avoiding the hazards of a single
national rule. Such an approach may well provide status and prac-
tical benefits to same-sex couples, enhance the visibility of same-sex
the ceremony and their wedding celebration, which they have called the "greatest day of
their lives." Dante Walkup & Mark Reed Walkup, Modernizing Marriage Through E-
Marriage, Panel Presentation at the Michigan State University Law Review Symposium:
Modernizing Marriage Through E-Marriage (Nov. 11, 2010).
10. For a discussion of marriage as a status good, see infra Section IV.A.
11. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
12. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
13. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1103, 1141-43 (2002) (discussing the ease by which
Delaware copies other states' corporate statutes).
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marriage with a relatively low level of confrontation, and create a
vehicle for new energy in state policy making.
Finally, we examine the cultural implication of widespread "im-
port and export" of the law of intimate relationships. 4 We look at
the potential for federalism to spread normative views of the family
and provide greater flexibility in family relations. Conversely, we
look at the risks involved in a federalism approach, when allowing
jurisdictions to offer differing definitions of family can erode the
value of universality in legal categories. We examine a rich array of
questions about the potential for states to create enhanced effi-
ciency and different choices to couples forming a family tie in a
mobile society and a federalist political structure.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I provides a short brief
in favor of distance marriage, arraying critical arguments and
themes that support the proposal. Section II examines the current
law of marriage formation, describing its unreflective, non-
innovative nature. Section III then looks briefly at the history of
marriage formation law to conclude that it has lost cognizable pur-
pose, despite whatever regulatory justifications it once had. Section
IV puts forth a new vision of marriage formation, in which states
could offer marriage to those outside their borders. This may fos-
ter competition over efficiency and convenience in marriage and
divorce procedures, as well the availability of other choices, such as
disclosure, important to marrying couples and of interest to the
state as a good that it might help foster. Section V analyzes our
proposal in light of the recent district court decisions declaring the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and California's Proposition 8
unconstitutional. We argue that our approach allows for the spread
of new forms of marriage in a way that, in contrast to constitutional
litigation, respects state autonomy. Finally, we put forth a brief
sketch of goals that legislation for absentee marriage should em-
phasize, providing a starting point for legislative deliberation.
14. One writer has described how federalism has led to "export" and "import" of law,
particularly in the area of civil rights. SeeJudith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptional-
ism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports ofEntry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1592-93 (2006)
("The jurisdictional interaction of international, national, and local bodies produced
changes in American law, sometimes unacknowledged and sometimes with direct attribu-
tion."); see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 78, 98, 103 (analyzing the current
"import" of law by temporary migration from one state to another and proposing the crea-
tion of a "national menu of property forms").
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1. MAKING THE CASE FOR DISTANCE MARRIAGE
Current marriage procedure is archaic, often strange, and, odd-
ly, rarely questioned.15 Virtually every state requires the physical
presence of a couple within its territory as a requirement for grant-
ing the benefits of ceremonial marriage. These rules for
ceremonial marriage range from both parties' physical presence
within the city or county authorizing the marriage to arbitrary re-
quirements for officiants' identity and residence." These
requirements constitute a regulatory relic of more rooted times
when marriage procedure had cognizable goals and make little
sense in our mobile society.
15. A law professor recently (for personal reasons) noticed Virginia's requirements that
lay, but not religious, officiants must be Virginia residents and invited blog discussion by other
legal professionals. See Ilya Somin, A Minor but Annoying Example of Unconstitutional Religious
Discrimination in Virginia Marriage Law, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2009, 12:05 AM),
http://volokh.com/2009/07/02/a-minor-but-annoying-example-of-unconstituional-religious-
discrimination-in-virginia-marriage-law/. Bloggers critically examined the constitutional issues
implicated, discussing whether the distinction unfairly discriminated against the non-religious,
but never raised the fundamental question: whether the entire regulatory regime had any
coherent, recognizable purpose.
To find a sustained, rigorous examination of the purpose of marriage formation law, one
must go back to the work of Mary E. Richmond, a founder of American professional social
work, who wrote an ignored classic, Marriage and the State, with Fred Hall, an eminent family
lawyer. It is a remarkable volume, brimming with a progressive faith in reform and social
scientific empiricism that catalogues and critiques the swathe of marriage law found in the
several states. Richmond warns that reform will be premature "until, for at least another
generation, the subject of marriage administration has been dealt with intelligently, system-
atically, and in careful detail." MARY E. RICHMOND & FRED S. HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE
STATE 337 n.1 (1929). Her call for examination of marriage regulation went largely un-
heeded. This strange stasis could be explained anthropologically in that the marriage
relationship is so basic that it is part of the unexamined, even unnoticed, social structure.
Or, it could be that no one bothers to litigate the matter. Even legal scholars whom the cur-
rent regulation harms or inconveniences, like Somin, can see no interest in litigating the
matter. See Somin, supra note 15.
16. See infra Section II.
17. See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
18. For the last century, state marriage laws have shown little development or analysis.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, concern for uniformity led to proposals
to amend the Constitution to nationalize the marriage laws, which is the rule in Canada and
Australia. Justice Frankfurter cited these efforts and the foreign examples and discussed
what the Court could do, within its institutional competence, to contribute to a second best
solution of substantial uniformity, particularly in divorce rules. Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287, 305 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing S. Doc. No. 93 (1926)); Ames,
Proposed A mendments to the Constitution of the United States during the First Century of its History, in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 190 (1896)); see also id. (citing
various sources concerning efforts to bring national uniformity to divorce laws). Rather than
a national law, fairly brittle local procedural rules govern marriage formation, with trends
generally favoring a degree of uniformity in the substance of the legal status. Joanna L.
Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem ofNon-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OREGON
L. REv. 433, 442-44 (2005).
Modernizing Marriage
The goals of marriage authorization law and practice shift from
era to era. In pre-modern and early industrial periods, laws requir-
ing parish churches to announce marriage using banns provided
publicity and notice, thereby preventing clandestine marriage and
encouraging Church and community control over marriage for-
mation. In addition, the banns encouraged detection of bigamy
and incest, real risks to guard against in a world of slow, costly
communication. In the nineteenth century, marriage rules began
to further less benign goals. States used marriage laws to address
issues of race (through restrictions on inter-racial marriage), and
the federal government drew on rules relating to marriage to regu-
late immigration (discouraging immigration of individuals from
certain, disfavored nations) and to discriminate against women in
several respects.'9 The nineteenth century also saw the emergence
of waiting periods to prevent impulsive marriage.o In the twentieth
century, the goals shifted to the more defensible attempt to further
public health, by requiring venereal disease screening.' In the
twenty-first century, with states minimizing or eliminating most
health screenings and waiting periods, the fixed form of marriage
authorization is little more than a nuisance.
What then might be a worthwhile regulatory goal for the twenty-
first century? We argue that modern marriage formation law
should offer convenience as well as provide some potential for
couples to choose a preferred regime for regulating the entry
point to marriage. The method for states to achieve this goal is
clear and surprisingly simple. States should revise their marriage
statutes to make their marriage formation laws accessible to those
beyond their physical boundaries. The proposal to modernize
these flawed statutes in response to contemporary needs then is
the opposite of a radical idea. Rather it builds on deeply rooted
19. See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MAR-
RIAGE, AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 119-20 (1998); PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009).
20. See RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 15, at 106-19 (offering a critical discussion of
lack of advance notice requirements, with chart showing dates of advance notice rules).
21. See infra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Section H. Local clerks' offices have the ability to interpose obstacles to cou-
ples' marriages. See, e.g., Peter Daining, Latino Group Sues Ottawa County Clerk: Discriminating
Marriage Licensing Aleged in Lawsuit, HOLLAND SENTINEL, May 11, 2010, http://
www.hollandsentinel.com/news/x1560854358/Latino-rights-group-sues-Ottawa-County-clerk;
see also Kent County Clerk Tells What She Really Doesn't Do, EL VOCERO HISPANO (Oct. 1, 2010,
9:51 AM), http://www.elvocerous.com/english-version/16130-kent-county-clerk-tells-what-
she-really-doesnt-do.
23. Our proposal builds on well-established precedent in which federalism has led to
export" and "import" of law, particularly in the area of civil rights. See Resnik, supra note 14,
at 1592-93.
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but overlooked precedent in both ancient" and modern law: mar-
riage by proxy," telegraph, telephone, and mail. Removing bar-
barriers imposed by geography would lower the cost of access to
any marriage where there is a problem of physical separation, as
well as offer access to marriages that are withheld from a couple by
the laws of another location. Today, the salient example is same-sex
marriage, but other possibilities, such as covenant marriage,2 9 or
24. See infra note 106 (discussing proxy marriage in Europe).
25. CAL. FAM. CODE § 420 (b) (West Supp. 2010) (providing for marriage of a member
of the U.S. Armed Forces who is serving overseas and in a conflict or war and who is unable
to appear to be married by means of a personal appearance by an attorney in fact with a
power of attorney that meets standards for witnesses); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-2-109 (2)
(2006) (permitting an officiant to exercise discretion if a third party holds a written authori-
zation to act for one of a couple "unable to be present" and providing for petition to a court
if the officiant "is not satisfied"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 120 (2009) (providing proce-
dures for an attending physician to act as proxy if he provides an affidavit that the marriage
applicant is at the point of death and may lawfully marry); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301
(2)-(4) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation) (permitting double proxy marriage and
requiring that one party to the marriage be "a member of the armed forces of the United
States on federal active duty or a resident of Montana at the time of application" and provid-
ing for discretion by the officiant and access to court to seek a court order if the officiant "is
not satisfied"); TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 2.006 (a)-(c) (West 2006) (generally permitting a
single proxy upon affidavit but permitting a double proxy marriage only if each applicant
provides an affidavit that he or she is "(1) on active duty as a member of the armed forces of
the United States or the state military forces; or (2) confined in a correctional facility").
26. Tom STANDARD, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELE-
GRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY'S ON-LINE PIONEERS 137-38 (2007) (describing a
telegraph wedding between an army telegraph operator at Camp Grant, Arizona and his
fianc6e in San Diego).
27. See infra note 123.
28. Proxy marriage, as well as other forms of distance marriage, has received both
scholarly and professional attention, but usually during wartime or shortly after, as the fol-
lowing listing of all known articles on the subject reveals. We attribute the timing of this
interest to the problem of soldiers leaving their intimate partners on the home front. We
have collected the various articles that have periodically addressed the matter, and then
languished with relatively little notice. See Lillian M. Gordon, Marriage by Proxy: The Need for
Certainty and Equality in the Laws of the American States, 20 Soc. SERV. REV. 29 (1946); W.H.
Howery, Marriage by Proxy and Other Informal Marriages, 13 UMKC L. REv. 48 (1944); Ernest
G. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARv. L. REv. 473 (1919); Marvin
M. Moore, The Case for Marriage by Proxy, 11 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REv. 313 (1962); A. A. Rob-
erts, Marriage by Proxy: Including a Brief Consideration of the Nature of Marriage and of Agency, 60
S. AFR. L.J. 280 (1943); William B. Stern, Marriages by Proxy in Mexico, 19 S. CAL. L. REv. 109
(1945); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in Family
Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 88 (1960); Comment, The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Ser-
vicemen, 55 YALE L.J. 735 (1946); Note, Marriage by Mail, 32 HARv. L. REV. 848 (1919); Note,
Marriage by Proxy-Conflict of Laws, 2 N.Y. L. REv. 343 (1924); Note, Validity of Proxy Marriages
in Kentucky, 35 Ky. L.J. 228 (1947); see also Maurice Possley, Marriage By Proxy Booming in Mon-
tana, MONT. LAw.,June-July 2007, at 32.
29. Louisiana offers "covenant marriage" in addition to standard marriage. Covenant
marriages are not dissolvable though no-fault divorce, in which either couple can simply
claim irreconcilable differences. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2008) ("A covenant mar-
riage terminates only for one of the causes enumerated in Civil Code Article 101. A cove-
covenant marriage may be terminated by divorce only upon one of the exclusive grounds
SUMMER 20111 Modernizing Marriage
even alternative forms for family life," could emerge." States are
unlikely to have a great interest in offering readier access to varia-
tions, such as close kinship marriage, which remain disapproved in
most states but permitted in some. In a symposium on e-marriage,
legislators (and one assistant clerk of court) in attendance con-
cluded that states that offer e-marriage should limit e-marriage to
those of legal maturity.32
By building on the proxy and other distance marriage prece-
dent, we do not unsettle long, established traditions. To the
contrary, the laws we have now are not a deep tradition, but rather
an expediency that developed in a slap-dash manner from our ear-
ly colonial society." As mentioned above, marriage procedure has
always been a part of changing regulatory regimes, reflecting de-
veloping notions of race, nationality, and public health. As such,
enumerated in R.S. 9:307."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (listing the grounds for terminat-
ing a covenant marriage by divorce as: adultery by one of the spouses; a spouse's conviction
of a felony followed by a sentence to death or imprisonment at hard labor; spousal aban-
donment for one year and the spouse's constant refusal to return; one spouse's physical or
sexual abuse of the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses; the spouses
have been living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of two
year; the spouse's excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse); see alsoJohn
Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, More Than a Mere Contract: Marriage as Contract and Covenant in
Law and Theology, 5 U. ST. THOMAs L.J. 595, 595 (2008) ("On August 15, 1997, the State of
Louisiana put in place the nation's first modern covenant marriage law. The law creates a
two-tiered system of marriage. Couples may choose a contract marriage, with minimal for-
malities of formation and attendant rights to no-fault divorce. Or couples may choose a
covenant marriage, with more stringent formation and dissolution rules."). Arizona and
Arkansas also offer covenant marriage. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2007)
(setting forth requirements similar to Louisiana's); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (2002)
(same).
SO. Larry Ribstein, Incorporating the Hendricksons, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y (forthcom-
ing 2011) (manuscript on file with authors) (critiquing proposals to use standard business
forms for intimate relationships); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family,
119 YALE L.J. 1236 (2010).
31. In a transitional moment in legal history, state variations in marriage are becoming
sufficiently salient so as to "brand" a particular state's marriage laws, i.e., Vermont same-sex
marriage or Louisiana covenant marriage. Modernized marriage laws would allow a Louisi-
anan to have a Vermont same-sex marriage in Louisiana while a Vermonter could have a
Louisiana covenant marriage. While Vermont may prefer not to enforce the terms of a Loui-
siana covenant marriage, couples who exchange vows in Vermont may still undertake a legal
covenant marriage under Louisiana law before their friends, family, and community. Cou-
ples can choose the marriage laws they prefer and thereby claim, in marriage, the freedom
Americans enjoy to define their own communities in legally relevant ways.
32. Bill Lippert et al., Remarks at Michigan State University Law Review Symposium:
Modernizing Marriage Through E-Marriage (Nov. 10, 2010). States could choose other re-
strictions as a matter of prudence, but it is likely that e-marriage could make access to
certain marriages, such as cousin marriage, available at a distance-as an incidental effect,
not an animating purpose.
33. For an historical discussion of the development of marriage procedures, see infra
Section III.
34. RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 15.
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the laws are not designed to serve the needs of couples for access
and convenience but rather to enforce cultural exclusions. The
laws have been rigid in their treatment of disfavored groups yet
readily evaded insofar as they were written to protect vulnerable
36.
women.
Beyond removing the territorial restrictions to marriage licens-
ing, states can develop new flexible procedures that take advantage
of technological innovations while maintaining safeguards that
preserve the idealized traditional marriage ceremony." States can
also introduce a requirement for couples to enter pre-agreements
to divorce jurisdiction for the status of marriage granted to couples
at a distance, and, indeed, "e-divorce" could simplify the difficulties
that same-sex married couples face when they try to divorce while
resident in a jurisdiction that does not recognize their marriage."
Rather than ossify, as have the existing formation regimes, these
procedures could compete with each other in accordance with
principles of federalism and jurisdictional markets.
Modernized marriage law might offer an important benefit for
some couples: disclosure. Under current law, marriage neither re-
quires disclosure nor offers help to prospective marital partners;
you could marry a convict and not know it.39 "Leap but don't look"
might have made sense when people lived in smaller communities
in which people had established reputations and gossip left few
hidden skeletons in peoples' closets, but less so in our mobile,
35. PASCOE, supra note 19.
36. RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 15.
37. Depending on legislative determinations of state policy preference, states have the
option of requiring teleconferencing or creating an internet "virtual" presence with the
authorizing state. Or states could simply allow couples outside their borders to receive and
file licenses easily by internet download, i.e., "e-marriage."
38. See infra Section IV.B.2; see also Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-Domas
Make, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 265, 265 (2007) (describing the legal difficulties same-sex married
couples face when divorcing while resident in states that do not recognize their unions).
There are constitutional issues to be sorted out in our suggestion of pre-agreements tojuris-
diction. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (confirming a domicile
requirement for a court to grant a divorce); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)
(providing additional guidance regarding the domicile rule); see also discussion infra Section
IV.B.2.
39. Common-sense intuition has some support in work done in Canada on "predatory
marriages," and in the actual experiences of some individuals. See, e.g., Wife of Notorious Serial
Killer Had "Wonderful Marriage," ABC7NEWS.COM (Apr. 30, 2007), http://abclocal.go.com/
kgo/story?section=news/national-world&id=5258036 (stating that the wife of the "Green
River Killer" met him after he was investigated as a suspect, but had no knowledge of his status
as a suspect). For the Canada study, see KIMBERLY WHALEY, THE "PREDATORY MARRIAGE," ITS
CONSEQUENCES, AND COSTS IN CAPACITY PROCEEDINGS (2010), available at
http://www.whaleyestatelitigation.com/resources/WELCBAPredatoryMarriage_081710.pdf.
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anonymous age in which many meet on the internet.' States could
offer a regime in which couples authorize disclosure of their arrest
or criminal records or credit or bankruptcy histories, either in ex-
change for excusing their physical presence within the state or, as a
fit for the notion advanced here of treating marrying couples as
responsible adults, with options allowing couples to choose their
desired level of disclosure. This procedure, which shifts the default
assumption toward disclosure as a routine option rather than an
unusual demand, might reduce the signaling problem created by
individuals seeking such information (e.g., "I love and trust you,
honey, but I'd like to see your credit history before I say 'I do.' ").41
It could seem odd for a partner to argue against the selection of
additional disclosure. The need to reject disclosure might thus
shift the burden of inquiry by a partner to a burden of refusal of a
standard service. States could accumulate experience in the desir-
42
ability of the differing formats and options presented.
As jurisdictions offer marriages beyond their borders, more
people will enter into marriage not recognized in their home state.
This leads to the question addressed above-what do people get
out of such marriages? We argue marriage is best described as a
hybrid of contract (it is an enabling regulation to create a legal re-
lationship) between two people and their children, if any), and
status good (it is a good that an official actor confers on behalf of
40. See CHADWICK MARTIN BAILEY & MATCH.COM, RECENT TRENDS: ONLINE DATING
(2010), available at http://cp.match.com/cppp/media/CMBStudy.pdf (stating that 17% of
couples married in the last year met on online dating site); Jessica M. Sautter, Rebecca M.
Tippett & 3. Philip Morgan, The Social Demography of Internet Dating in the United States, 91
Soc. Sci. Q. 554 (2010) ("Internet dating is a common mate selection strategy among the
highly selective subpopulation of single Internet users and may continue to grow through
social networks."); Courtney Stoddard, Hooking Up and Connecting Lives: Online Dating
and the Economics of Marriage Search (Sept. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University) (on file with authors) (finding that "online dating has become in-
creasingly important as a part of an individual's search strategy" in the marriage market).
41. Many have identified this signaling problem as a reason for the relative lack of use
of pre-nuptial agreements. Prospective spouses don't want each other to know that he or she
is contemplating the possibility of an outcome of divorce.
42. States could experiment with types of "prompts" encouraging a "Yes" reply. Pros
and cons of background checks are an emerging issue relating to dating patterns. Stephanie
Rosenbloom, New Online-Date Detectives Unmask Mr or Mrs. Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19date.html? r=1&ref=stephanierosenbloom.
One negative consideration is false assurance provided by a dating site about a stranger. Id.
Once marriage is contemplated, the risk of false assurance might have much less weight as a
concern. More diligence in uncovering information could only help.
Indeed, states are beginning to regulate internet dating sites to try to assure safety. Id.
The logic of states regulating commercial match-making services to help assure safety, while
simultaneously offering marriage formalization to couples who may be strangers to one
another, without any provision of cautionary advice or protocols for background checks,
may seem increasingly difficult to rationalize. Id.
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civil society) with.two sets of benefits. Modernized marriage leads
to a wider distribution of marriage's status benefits, even if couples
may still be denied the attendant contract benefits. This is particu-
larly true for same-sex couples." These couples would have the
symbolic benefit of entering into an authorized marriage that sev-
eral states and foreign jurisdictions might recognize. The status
value of this ceremony is significant and is reflected in the vast
amounts people spend on wedding ceremonies and, with same-sex
couples, the expense to travel to states that authorize their mar-
*45
riages.
Finally, distance marriages offer legal benefits to same-sex cou-
ples. Several states, including Maryland and New York, now
recognize out-of-state same-sex marriage, although they are not
themselves authorized to issue licenses to same-sex couples.4 6 In
these states, distance marriage would allow same-sex couples to
have ceremonies (and locally enforceable marriages) within their
home states, even though their home state refuses to authorize
such unions. The status may gain recognition for purposes of fed-
eral law, either because Congress repeals the Defense or Marriage
Act ("DOMA")4 1 or because the recent holdings that DOMA is un-
constitutional are upheld in whole or in part.48 Moreover, same-sex
43. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 30, at 1258 (discussing the status value of public
recognition and concluding that the "quest for recognition is part of the ideology of the
established family").
44. While a Vermont same-sex marriage is not legally cognizable in Louisiana, a mod-
ernized marriage law would allow Louisiana same-sex couples to celebrate an "official"
wedding authorized by another state's law before family and friends at their place of wor-
ship. See CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, M.V. LEE BADGETT & BRAD SEARS, WILLIAMS INST., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EXTENDING MARRIAGE TO SAME-SEX COUPLES IN VERMONT 1, 7
(2009), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/pdf/VT%20econ%20impact
%20final.pdf (estimating the travel-related expenses for out-of-state couples seeking mar-
riage in Vermont will be an average of $910.00).
45. See id.
46. See Aaron C. Davis & John Wagner, Maryland to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages from
Other Places, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2010, at A01; Jeremy W. Peters, New York Backs SameSex
Unions from ElsewheE, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at Al (Editor's Note: New York enacted a
same-sex marriage law on June 24, 2011). The Coquille Tribe authorizes same-sex marriages
and explicitly recognizes same-sex marriages -entered into in other jurisdictions. Coquille
Tribal Reg., Ch. 741: Marriage and Domestic Partnership Regulation, available at
http://www.coquilletribe.org/documents/741MarriageRegulation.pdf.
47. Pub. Law No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C).
48. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010) (stating that
DOMA violates the "principles embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment"); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249 (D.
Mass. 2010) (stating that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment).
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marriage has recognition under international human rights prin-
ciples 9 and in a growing number of state laws.o
II. LOOKING FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES: MARRIAGE
PROCEDURE NOW AND THEN
Except for the handful of jurisdictions that recognize common
law marriages," all states require those seeking marriage to per-
form some type of procedure that is relatively uniform but often
oddly burdensome.2 Most of us simply take these requirements for
granted: file some papers, show a driver's license, receive a mar-
riage license, and get solemnized.
But these procedures have costs that extend well beyond the fil-
ing fees and administrative expenses. As mentioned above, they
often prevent those who face barriers of physical separation, par-
ticularly those in the military, from marrying. They often prevent
individuals from having the officiant5 or other procedure they de-
sire, or create a delay, not an insignificant cost given the money
lavished on the ceremony. Those who have destination marriages
49. There are forces pointing strongly toward support for family formation, and hence
marriage, in international law. Human Rights Watch argues for a right to form families.
Rulings Support Same-Sex Marriage, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 10, 2010), http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/08/10/rulings-support-same-sex-marriage. A report on a Eu-
ropean case that refused to call same-sex marriage a right noted that there were three
dissents. Same-Sex Marriage Claim Rejected by European Court of Human Rights, PHD IN HUMAN
RIGHTS BLOG (June 27, 2010), http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2010/06/same-
sex-marriage-claim-rejected-by.html.
50. States may recognize a marriage validly celebrated elsewhere even if violating local
substantive law, because the violation is not thought to implicate a very important public
policy. Compare Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ohio 1958) (upholding validity
of first-cousin marriage validly celebrated elsewhere even though that marriage was substan-
tively prohibited under local law), with In re Stiles Estate, 391 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio 1979)
(denying validity of uncle-niece marriage validly celebrated elsewhere which could not be
contracted within the state).
51. See G6RAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHABITA-
TION 179 (2008) ("Common law marriage has its origins in old English ecclesiastical law
[and its recognition of clandestine marriage] .... [T]he fundamental principles for com-
mon law marriage were received into the American case law. Guiding the American
development was Fenton v. Reed[, 4 Johns. 52] (1809), in which the New York Supreme
Court, without reference to earlier American case law, but citing three English cases [involv-
ing clandestine marriage], stated: 'No formal solemnization of marriage was requisite. A
contract of marriage made per verba de praesenti amounts to an actual marriage, and is as valid
as if made in facie ecclesiae.' The decision, supported by the leading scholarship, had remark-
able impact on the case law during the entire 1800s [helping to establish the recognition of
common law marriage'].").
52. Examples include rigid limits on who may be an officiant, see Somin, supra note 15,
and specifications of what county may issue a license for residents of a state, see infra note 65.
53. See Somin, supra note 15 (discussing Virginia law limiting choice of preferred offi-
ciant).
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to exotic locales must rely upon the sometimes unreliable local
government procedures and often fear that they will not have le-
gally recognizable marriages, 4 a true disappointment given the
expense of such marriages.
Despite these costs, current marriage procedures offer no obvi-
ous benefits to couples. In the past, as mentioned above, these
procedures served cognizable goals such as publicity to prevent
bigamy and incest and prevention of venereal disease. Today, bene-
fits such as in-state expenditures accrue to states, not to couples.
Our proposal reinvigorates the state role in regulating entry into
marriage in a way that facilitates couple autonomy and rationally
shapes the state involvement to reflect contemporary needs, given
the mobility of the population and the growing use of technology
to form social connections and make legal agreements. Access to
different jurisdictions' marriage laws empowers couples to select
the most convenient and efficient procedures. Further, states
would have incentives to experiment, giving marriage formation
procedure regulatory goals that make sense in our world. We be-
lieve that disclosure can be such a purpose. It is for the states and
couples to find the correct balance of couple autonomy and regu-
latory schemes.16
The rules governing the creation and recognition of marriage
involve four legal matters:
1. the marriage procedure (licenses, solemnization,
etc.);
2. the consequences of any procedural errors;
3. the substantive determination of who is eligible to
be married under the laws of a given state; and,
4. the conflict-of-law analysis of whether a marriage is
valid in a state other than the marriage-granting
state.
States have remarkably similar and uncontroversial procedures.
States generally do not question other states' marriage determina-
54. In discussions about their own and others' destination weddings, students have de-
scribed to Professor Kuykendall the uncertainties of foreign marriage protocols, which
create costs and a sense of unease.
55. Vermont, for example, has a strong commitment to principles ofjustice, a pride in
its leadership rule in marriage equality, and an interest in establishing a general reputation
as an innovator. Oliver Goodenough, Remarks at American Association of Law Schools An-
nual Meeting: Hot Topics Panel (Jan. 7, 2011); see also infra text accompanying notes 217-
219 (concerning incentives for states to export desirable law).
56. For a theoretically rich discussion of the possibility of offering "statist" options in
family law that may be selected voluntarily, see Ristroph & Murray, supra note 30, at 14 (re-
ferring to "authoritarianism with a voluntarist face").
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tions following the ancient legal maxim of lex loci celebrationis, un-
der which states recognize marriage as valid if it was valid in the
jurisdiction in which it was performed or authorized. While states
observe lex loci, they allow for a public policy exception, under
which they will not recognize a marriage of a sister state if it disa-
grees with the state's substantive eligibility determination (i.e.,
same-sex, in a few states, first cousin, and, in the past, mixed-race
marriages).
Courts typically overlook procedural imperfections, such as the
instances where couples solemnized their marriage in a state or
county in which their license was not intended under the statute to
be valid for use, and recognize such marriage on the public policy
justification of favoring marriage.5 ' This was true even when the
rules specifying which county was the proper venue were intended
for the protection of women5 and thus had a rationale other than
inchoate ideas about marriage as a local concern.
57. Barbosa-johnson v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a valid
marriage where the parties used an Arizona marriage license for a wedding taking place in
Puerto Rico); De Potty v. De Potty, 295 S.W.2d 330 (Ark. 1956) (finding a valid marriage in
Arkansas despite the use of a Texas marriage license); McPeek v. McCardle, 888 N.E.2d 171
(Ind. 2008) (finding a valid marriage when the couple complied with the Indiana marriage
laws even though the marriage was not performed in the state); State v. Brem, 178 P.2d 582
(N.M. 1947) (finding that despite having a license issued in New Mexico the marriage per-
formed in Texas was valid either because the marriage license requirement in Texas is
directory or because the couple fulfilled the elements of common law marriage while living
in the state); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 273 N.YS.2d 728 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (finding a valid marriage
where the couple used a New Mexico license to marry in California because there was sol-
emnization by a rabbi); In re Compulsory Accounting in the Estate of Farraj, No. 4803/07,
2009 WL 997481 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009) (finding a marriage as valid under New York law based
on the parties' expectation and the solemnization ceremony despite the invalidity of the
marriage in New Jersey where it was performed). But see Kisla v. Kisla, 19 S.E.2d 609 (W. Va.
1942) (refusing to find a valid West Virginia marriage where the couple had obtained and
used a Pennsylvania marriage license but recognizing the couple's child as legitimate).
58. Wallace v. Screws, 149 So. 226 (Ala. 1923) (finding that failure to obtain a license
from the female's home county does not render any subsequent marriage void for that rea-
son); Ely v. Gammel, 52 Ala. 584 (1875) (finding that a marriage is not void when the license
used to solemnize the marriage was not issued by the female's home county); People v. Lin-
inger, 71 P.2d 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937) (finding that failure to use a marriage license in the
issuing county does not void the marriage); Minshew v. State, 102 S.E. 906 (Ga. Ct. App.
1920) (finding a valid marriage even if the license was obtained in the wrong county); Peo-
ple v. Reynolds, 217 Ill. App. 577 (App. Ct. 1920) (finding that marriages are not void for
want of compliance with the statute unless the statute expressly states the invalidity of said
marriages); Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. 193 (17 B. Mon. 193) (Ct. App. 1856) (finding that
failure to obtain a marriage license in the female's home county did not invalidate the mar-
riage); Gatewood v. Tunk, 6 Ky. 246 (3 Bibb. 246) (CL App. 1813) (finding that if a marriage
is solemnized by a minister, failure to provide a license from the appropriate county will not
invalidate the marriage); State v. Trull, 85 So. 70 (La. 1920) (finding a valid marriage where
the couple obtained a license from a parish where neither lived and then used the license to
solemnize a marriage in a different parish); Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E. 294 (Mass. 1919) (find-
ing an irregular marriage because the license issued was not used in the issuing town but
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Despite this leniency, the laws on the books typically dictate to
couples the options for planning and conducting their wedding.
A. Typical Procedure for Marriage Formation
Despite the legal implications of marriage, couples do not con-
sult lawyers in order to marry. Rather, they call the clerk's office to
ask about the basic steps or check the website's how-to explana-
tions. 9 Most offices offer clear statements limiting the use of a
license to within the state and forbidding the use of an out-of-state
l*60license.
1. Getting the License
States do not use the licensing statutes to impose regulations
and monitor their enforcement to affect the care with which cou-
finding the marriage saved in that it was otherwise lawful); In Re Silverman's Estate, 227 A.2d
519 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (finding a valid marriage when the license was not is-
sued from the bride's county of residence); Abbott's Petition, 27 Pa. D. & C. 205 (Ct.
Common Pl. 1935) (finding a valid marriage where two minors failed to obtain a license
from the appropriate county prior to the marriage and the license that was issued after the
marriage was not from the county where the marriage was performed); Douglas v. Douglas,
6 Tenn. App. 12 (Ct. App. 1927) (finding a valid marriage where the ceremony was per-
formed in a county adjoining the issuing county and all other formalities had been ful-
fulfilled).
59. See Marriage FAQ, WWW.CITYCLERK.NYC.Gov, http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/
marriage/faq.shtml#married (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("The contract must be signed by
both parties and at least two witnesses and all signatures must be given within the State.");
Marriage Licenses, WWW.CLARKCOUNTYNV.GOV, http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/clerk/
Services/Pages/MarriageLicenses.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) ("In order to have a legal
marriage, a ceremony must be performed in the State of Nevada within one year from the
date of issuance of the marriage license .... The ceremony may be performed at any wed-
ding chapel, church, Office of Civil Marriages, or anywhere a licensed minister is willing to
perform a ceremony within the State of Nevada."); Alachua County, Fla., Marriage/Online
Application, WWW.ALACHUACOUNTY.US, http://www.alachuacounty.us/government/clerk/
famlaw/marriage.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) ("Do both parties have to be present at
the Clerk's office to apply for a license? Yes."); see also Marriage License-Laws, U.S. MARRIAGE
LAws, http://www.usmarriagelaws.com/search/unitedstates/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2009)
(providing a summary of each state's marriage laws and links to the state bureaus or clerks).
60. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, PERFORMING MARRIAGE CEREMONIEs: A
GUIDE FOR FLORIDA NOTARIES PUBLIC 10 (1999), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/notary/wedding-handbook.pdf ("Additionally, a Notary from another
state, including South Carolina and Maine, may not perform a marriage ceremony in Flori-
da. And, a Florida notary may not marry a couple who has obtained a marriage license from
another state.").
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ples make the decision whether and when to marry.' A couple that
wants to marry almost always applies for a marriage license from a
county clerk in the state where the couple wishes the wedding to
take place. The license asks couples to answer questions concern-
ing basic personal data." After the application is made a clerk is-
63issues the license to the couple for later use. Waiting periods for a
license are generally nonexistent or minimal.6 States typically specify
that the couple must obtain a license from the county where the
marriage will be perfonned, where the parties reside, or from the
state. 5 Some states insist on having both parties present when apply-
ing for a license, while others are more flexible." Documentation
61. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1625, 1628 (2007) ("State marriage law today primarily regulates marriage only during the
entry and exit stages, and even then, the regulation is very light.").
62. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.004 (West 2006) (describing the questions on a marriage
license application). In 1929, Richmond and Hall expressed dismay that clerks tolerate per-
jury in license applications and make no effort to refer perjury in the applications for
prosecution. RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 15, at 73.
63. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.009 (West 2006 & West Supp. 2009) (describing the issu-
ance of the license from the clerk after the application is made).
64. Richmond and Hall described the "modern" approach-as of 1929-as not more
than five days. RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 15, at 109. Abrams counts two states as of 2007
as having five-day waiting periods and thirteen as having three-day waiting periods. See
Abrams, supra note 61, at 1647 n.10 7 . Some states have a waiting period, typically ranging
from one to three days during which the license cannot be used. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 13-b
(McKinney 1999) (stating that the marriage license cannot be used within twenty-four hours
of issuance); Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.204 (West 2006 & West Supp. 2009) (requiring a
seventy-two hour waiting period before the marriage license can be used but waiving this
requirement if the couple obtains pre-marital counseling). A rough count of states reveals
that around half of the states now have no waiting period. As recently as 1968, the lack of a
waiting period was viewed as a telling detail in writer Joan Didion's description of Las Vegas
weddings as exemplars of "geographic implausibility," loss of connection to "real life," and
provision of "the facsimile of proper ritual" to those "who want it but lack knowledge of how
to do it."Joan Didion, MarryingAbsurd, in SLOUCHING TOWARD BETHLEHEM 79 (2d ed. 2008)
("The State of Nevada, alone among these United States, demands neither a premarital
blood test nor a waiting period before or after the issuance of a marriage license."). For a
general summary of waiting period and blood test requirements, see Marriage License
Requirements, FINDLAw, http://family.findlaw.com/marriage/marriage-laws/marriage-blood-
test.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:222 (2008) (stating that a marriage license may be ob-
tained in any parish no matter where the parties live or where the ceremony will be
performed); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 551.101 (West 2005) (requiring couples to obtain a
license from the county of residence of either party and, if non-residents, from the county
where the marriage will be performed).
66. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 225 (2008) (stating that no license shall be issued unless
both parties presented themselves with a certified copy of their birth certificate); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (2008) (allowing parties to either apply for a marriage license in writing
when accompanied by an affidavit of age from a next of kin or appear in person and take an
oath to prove age); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-104 (2005) (requiring both parties to present
themselves to the clerk unless one is incarcerated or ill in which case a notarized statement
can be used instead). In 1929, Richmond and Hall regarded the personal presence of both
parties in the clerk's office as critical to protecting underage girls, the mentally deficient,
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such as proof of identity, age, and social security number, is typically
required , and some states require the marriage candidates to
provide a social security number on the application for the mar-
riage license.6 The licensing stage is an opportunity to enforce age
limitations' and, for a few states, to require medical testing, either
for information or for restricting access to a license to marry.vo
Some states encourage couples to attend pre-marital counseling or
offer incentives for doing so, like waiver of a waiting period after
issuance of the license or reduced fees." A minimal fee is usually
charged for the issuance of a marriage license. While states have
generally abandoned waiting periods of any appreciable length at
all, marriage licenses are valid for a limited time.
and so forth, and lamented a dearth of law or procedures assuring it. RICHMOND & HALL,
supra note 15, at 51-52.
67. Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.002 (West 2006 & West Supp. 2009); id. § 2.005 (requir-
ing proof of identity and age with birth certificate, license, passport).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 551.102(1) (West 2007) (requiring the parties to place
their social security numbers on the application for the marriage license); ThNN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-104 (2005) (requiring the contracting parties to apply for the marriage license and
provide social security numbers).
69. ALA. CODE § 30-14 (1975) (stating parties under sixteen are not able to contract a
marriage); TENN. CODE ANN. 36-3-105 (2005) (stating that it is unlawful to issue a marriage
license to parties who have not reached the age of sixteen); Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.009
(West 2006 & West Supp. 2009) (allowing minors to marry if they obtain parental consent,
have previously been divorced, or have a court order finding that marriage is in the child's
best interest).
70. For example, New York requires certain marriage license applicants to submit to
testing for sickle cell anemia but will not invalidate a marriage where the parties fail to get
the testing and cannot deny the license solely because the tests come back positive. N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAw § 13-aa (McKinney 1999); see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (2008) (requiring a med-
ical certificate showing that the applicant does not have syphilis). Most states do not require a
blood test. See Blood Test for Marnage License, U.S. MARRIAGE LAws, http://
www.usmarriagelaws.com/search/unitedcstates/blood-test-requirements/mandatory/index.s
html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
71. Tkx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.013 (West 2006 & West Supp. 2009) (encouraging pre
marital counseling and offering objectives of the course); id. § 2.204 (waiving the seventy-
two hour waiting period if a couple attends marriage counseling).
72. ALA. CODE. § 30-1-8 (1975) (stating that persons who solemnize marriages are enti-
tled to $2.00); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 551.7 (West 2008) (stating that if a mayor
performs a marriage s/he may charge a fee determined by the city council and deposited
into the city's general fund); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 551.103(2) (West 2007) (requiring a
twenty-dollar fee to be paid by parties applying for a marriage license); TEx. Loc. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 118.018 (West 2008) (noting that a fee is associated with the issuance of the
marriage license and is due when the license is issued).
73. See Waiting Period for Marriage Licenses, U.S. MARRIAGE LAws, http://
usmaniagelaws.com/search/unitedstates/waiting_period-marriage license/index.shtml
(last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
74. ALA. FAM. CODE § 30-1-9 (1975) (stating that Alabama license is only valid for thirty
days from the date it is issued); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (West 2006) (stating that li-
cense is only valid for thirty-one days after issuance).
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2. Regulations Affecting the Ceremony.
There is no specific blueprint for the proper marriage ceremony
but many states require that, at a minimum, the parties declare
their desire to be husband and wife in the presence of an officiant
and sometimes of witnesses. Most couples assume they must be
present in the state that marries them; gay couples in the recent
weddings rode in buses to marry in Iowa, and no one commented
that it was odd to require their brief physical presence.
State statutes specify the parties who are qualified to solemnize a
marriage. Some states impose fairly rigid, territorial based limita-
tions backed by criminal sanctions, and others provide flexible
75. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 551.9 (West 2005) (requiring that the parties declare in
the presence of the officiant and two witnesses that they take one another as husband or
wife); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 12 (McKinney 1999) (requiring at least one witness be present
at the marriage ceremony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-302 (2009) (requiring that the parties
take one another as husband and/or wife in the presence of the minister/officer).
76. The basis for the assumption is the long practice, originating from the physical
convenience of local licensing, that came to seem natural and hence a given of how the state
authorizes formal marriage. One state, Arizona, has a governing case holding that an Arizo-
na license can be used anywhere in the world. See infra note 97. Yet a call by Prof. Kuykendall
to the Maricopa County Clerk's office yielded a response that licenses are only valid for use
in Arizona. In a recent incident involving a gay couple's use of a D.C. marriage license in
Texas, with an authorized person officiating by Skype from D.C., a spokesman for the D.C.
Superior Court explained the District's cancellation of the marriage certificate as follows:
"Marriage statutes in the District of Columbia (dating back to 1901) requires [sic] marriages
to be celebrated within the jurisdictional and territorial boundaries of the city .... Both the
officiant and the parties to the marriage must be physically present at the ceremony per-
formed in the district." Gay Men Fight on After Court Deems Skype Marriage Invalid, CNN (Dec.
4, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-04/us/dc.gay.marriage_1_gay-marriage-marriage-
statutes-skype?_s=PM:US. The official cited no evidence, either of the assertion regarding
history or the current meaning of the D.C. statute. Id.
77. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 551.7 (West 2008) (stating that a district court judge or
magistrate may perform marriages in the districts he or she serves, a municipal judge in the
city/township, a probate judge in the court district, a federal judge seemingly anywhere in
the state, a mayor anywhere in the county where the city he or she is mayor of is located, a
county clerk in the county where he or she works, religious ministers anywhere in the state,
etc.); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1999) (stating that only federal judges of the
Second Circuit and the districts in New York and various other judges presiding within the
state may solemnize marriages); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-25 (2004) (stating federal judges who
are residents of the state may solemnize weddings within the state).
78. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN § 551.15 ("If any person should undertake to join others
in marriage, knowing that he is not lawfully authorized so to do, or knowing of any legal
impediment to the proposed marriage, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not more
than 1 year, or by a fine not less than 50 nor more than 500 dollars, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."). Ristroph and Murray discuss the use of
criminal law "to enforce a particular model of the family." See Ristroph & Murray, supra note
30, at 1241. This sort of criminal statute concerning improper officiating seems a vestige of
the use of criminal law to shape the family, unenforced but present on the statute books as a
hyperbolic statutory warning of the overhang of state control.
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one-day certifications. In other states, officiants are typically de-
scribed as members of the clergy, judiciary, or other public officials
such as a mayor."0 States generally recognize that the rules should
respect religious traditions that do not adhere to the format of hav-
ing an officiant who presides and declares the couple to be
married."' For example, New York allows couples to enter a written
contract and effectively marry themselves in the presence of a
judge or other official of the state.g2 Statutes often specify that a
good faith belief that an officiating person had authority is suffi-
cient to create a valid marriage even though the belief was
mistaken. The rules for who may officiate generally can be over-
come if a desired officiant becomes a member of the Universal Life
Church, which allows virtually anyone to become a minister.
79. Massachusetts allows any friend or family member to marry a couple so long as the
application is sent in six weeks in advance. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 207, § 39 (1991). Vermont
will temporarily certify someone to officiate over a wedding within the state provided that
person meets the statutory requirements. VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, § 5144a (2008).
80. ALA. FAM. CODE. § 30-1-7 (1975) (naming licensed ministers, judges, pastors of re-
ligious societies). Massachusetts is already providing, on the Governor's website, a
prominent offer for flexibility as to officiants, which permits any friend or family member to
apply for a one-day designation to preside at a wedding in Massachusetts. See One Day Mar-
riage Designation Instructions, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS,
http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=gov3modulechunk&L=l &LO=Home&sid=Agov3&b=terminal
content&f=one.day.marriage-designation instructions&csid=Agov3 (last visited on Apr. 14,
2011).
81. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 12 (McKinney 1999) (stating that the marriage solemniza-
tion requirements of the state do not apply to the Quaker religions); TENN. CODE ANN § 36-
3-301 (2005) (stating that a marriage where there are witnesses but no presiding officiant is
valid); 2009 VT. ACTS & RESOLVES 3 (stating that the solemnization requirements of the state
do not mandate an officiant for Quaker ceremonies); see also Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial
Family Law, 94 IowA L. REV. 449, 494 (2009).
82. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2009); id. § 12 (simply requiring the couple
to take one another as husband or wife in the presence of a magistrate or clergyman).
83. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (West 2006) (stating that the marriage will still be
valid even when officiant lacks authority so long as there was no indication that the officiant
lacked authority or the parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid); UNIF.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 206.d, 9A U.L.A. 182 (1998) (stating that a marriage is still
valid even if the party solemnizing the marriage was not qualified if the parties believe he or
she was qualified).
84. Universal Life Church v. Utah, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Utah 2002) (holding un-
constitutional a 2001 Utah statute providing that ordination by the internet is not valid for
purposes of eligibility to preside as a minister in a Utah marriage ceremony).
85. Become a Minister and Get Ordained, UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH MONASTERY,
http://www.themonastery.org/?destination=ordination (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) ("At the
ULC Monastery, we believe that ordination should be available to all who seek and ask."); see
also Universal Life Church, 189 F. Supp. at 1307 ("The ULC will ordain anyone free, for life,
without questions of faith. Anyone can be ordained a ULC minister in a matter of minutes
by clicking onto the ULC's website and by providing a name, address, and e-mail address.
Anyone can also be ordained by mailing to the ULC a name and address. There is no oath,
ceremony, or particular form required.").
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3. Clerical and Record-Keeping Rules
The officiant is typically responsible for returning the license
and certificate to the appropriate county clerk.86 Local officials of-
ten have record-keeping obligations. The payoff for the statutory
commitment in favor of requiring that marriages occur under local
control and be documented by strict records is low. With decentral-
ized administration and old-fashioned hard copy records, it is only
to be expected that marriage statistics are not especially valuable to
researchers, at least as compared with what could be generated by
the use of internet-enhanced collection."
4. Lenient Ex Post Enforcement: Forgiveness of
Procedural Flaws
Courts, with relatively rare exceptions,89 do not see the rules as
sufficiently controlling as to invalidate marriages. When the rules
86. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 551.104 (West 2007) (requiring the officiant to fill in
the blank marriage license/certificate and return it to the issuing clerk within ten days of
the ceremony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-303 (2005) (stating that the person who solemnizes
the marriage must return it within three days to the issuing clerk); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.206 (West 2006) (stating that the person conducting the ceremony is responsible for
recording the license and returning it to the county that issued it within thirty days of the
ceremony); id. § 2.208 (describing the information that the county clerk must record upon
receipt of the marriage license); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 206.a, 9A U.L.A. 182
(1998) (requiring that a party to the marriage complete the marriage license and send it to
the issuing clerk).
87. ALA. CODE § 30-1-12 (1975) (stating that the probate judge must keep a book with
a record of all the licenses issued by him/her); ALA. CODE § 30-1-13 (1975) (stating that if a
person other than the probate judge performs the marriage, he or she must send infor-
mation regarding the marriage to the probate court for proper registration); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 551.104 (West 2007) (stating that persons officiating over a marriage ceremony
should keep a record of the marriages performed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103 (2005)
(stating that the county clerk who issues licenses is authorized to record the license when
returned to the clerk).
88. Marriage and Divorce Related Statistics, NATIONAL HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE
CENTER, http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org/collections-by-topic/marriage-and-divorce-
related-statistics#Collection%20and%2OQuality (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); see also Hugh
Carter, National Marriage and Divorce Statistics: Progress Report, 1945-1955, 70 PUa. HEALTH
REP. 347 (1955), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2024537/
pdf/pubhealthreporigOO160-0013.pdf.
89. Edwards v. Franke, 364 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1961) (refusing to find a valid marriage
where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license and finding that the Alaska statute
banning common law marriage was mandatory and not directory); Welch v. State, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 430 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding no valid marriage where the couple did not get a
marriage license or solemnize the marriage aside from privately taking vows); Williams v.
Williams, 460 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no valid marriage where the couple
did not get a marriage license); Nelson v. Marshall, 869 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(failing to find a valid marriage where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license); Farah
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are violated, courts employ various savings doctrines, with more or
less legal precision," to hold procedurally deficient marriages valid.
Courts will often take the initiative to "fix" procedural violations,
including failure to file the license as required,9' an insufficient
number of witnesses," ineligibility of the presiding official," and
marriage in the wrong county. Now, state marriage law seems to
serve no other purpose than to provide a veneer of state control
and approval and lacks a clear regulatory purpose, except perhaps
to perpetuate its own administrative apparatus. The ex ante rules
drive the process but are often understood ex post to be a brittle
94bit of law that should not be a barrier to recognizing a marriage.
Couples face the greatest risk if they intentionally ignore a rule,
especially the rule requiring that a license be used within the state
v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a marriage void where the parties en-
tered a proxy marriage in England that failed to meet the statutory requirements although
there was a religious ceremony).
90. Farley v. Farley, 10 So. 646 (Ala. 1892) (finding a valid but voidable marriage where
no marriage license was obtained and solemnizer was not authorized); Darling v. Dent, 100
S.W. 747 (Ark. 1907) (finding that a marriage could be valid despite failure to obtain or
record a marriage license); Carabetta v. Carabetta, 438 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1980) (finding a
valid marriage where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license but had the marriage
solemnized in a religious ceremony and the statutory requirements were deemed to be advi-
sory); Gay v. Pantell, 139 S.E. 543 (Ga. 1927) (finding that a marriage performed without a
license was voidable not void); Feehley v. Feehley, 99 A. 663 (Md. 1916) (finding a valid
marriage where the parties failed to obtain a marriage license but participated in a religious
ceremony); Haggin v. Haggin, 53 N.W. 209 (Neb. 1892) (finding that failure to obtain a
marriage license did not affect the validity of a marriage); Berenson v. Berenson, 98 N.Y.S.2d
912 (Fam. Ct. 1950) (finding that failure to obtain marriage license did not invalidate the
marriage); Heller v. Heller, 68 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (finding that failure to procure a
marriage license did not invalidate a marriage); In re Cossin's Estate, 126 N.YS.2d 363 (Sur.
Ct. 1953) (finding that failure to obtain a marriage license did not affect the validity of a
marriage solemnized by a religious ceremony); In re Kaminsky's Will, 126 N.YS.2d 220 (Sur.
Ct. 1953) (finding a valid marriage where the parties were married in a religious ceremony
despite failure to obtain a marriage license); In re Levy's Estate, 6 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sur. Ct.
1938) (finding that failure to procure a license did not invalidate a marriage); State v. Par-
ker, 11 S.E. 517 (N.C. 1890) (finding that failure to procure a marriage license did not
invalidate a marriage); State v. Robbins, 28 N.C. 23 (1845) (finding that failure to obtain a
marriage license did not invalidate a marriage); Chapman v. Chapman, 32 S.W. 564 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1895) (finding a valid marriage despite failure to obtain a marriage license); Mor-
ville v. State, 141 S.W. 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911) (finding that a marriage license is
evidence of marriage but noL a prerequisite of marriage); McDonald v. White, 89 P. 891
(Wash. 1907) (finding a valid marriage where it was unclear whether parties obtained a
marriage license).
91. Krizman v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 58 P.2d 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (finding
that marriage in foreign state not invalidated by failure to record marriage certificate).
92. Parker v. Saileau, 213 So. 2d 190 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
93. Shamsee v. Shamsee, 381 N.YS.2d 127 (App. Div. 1976).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58, 89-93; infra text accompanying notes 97-
98.
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that issued it.9" One state attorney general has issued an opinion
offering a purportedly complete proof that a couple that uses the
state's license in another state would not have a valid marriage un-
der the law of any state."
Courts often construe the marriage code liberally, as containing
authorization to couples to marry outside the jurisdiction but pur-
suant to its ceremonial marriage laws. For instance, in a
95. A concurrence and a dissent in De Potty v. De Potty, 295 S.W.2d 330 (Ark. 1956) crys-
tallizes the strong, but fading view regarding strict, good faith compliance with a territorial
rule on using a license. A concurrence places the following gloss on the holding:
I feel sure that the opinion in this case intends only to approve a marriage relation-
ship [without license] only where; (a) the parties engaged in a ceremony substantially
in compliance with that prescribed by the statutes; (b) the parties to the ceremony
acted in good faith and believed that they were complying with all the provisions of
our statutes; (c) they consummated the ceremony by cohabitation, and; (d) the proof
of (a), (b), and (c) mentioned above is clear and convincing.
Id. at 332 (Ward, J., concurring). A dissent quaintly captured the sense of territoriality as a
critical factor in marriage law:
The validity of a marriage-in the absence of any questions of public policy in the
domiciliary state-is determined by the law of the state wherein the marriage is con-
tracted. So Arkansas has the right-in fact, the duty-to determine what is a valid
marriage in this State. Our laws provide for the issuance of a license, form of the li-
cense, applicants being required to take blood tests, sobriety, waiting period,
performance of the marriage ceremony, and returning of the certificate of marriage
to the issuing county. In short, up to the date of this case, if anyone had wanted to see
about a marriage, the information could have been found in the office of the county
clerk wherein the marriage license was issued. Hereafter where will we look for the
recording of a marriage performed in Arkansas? According to this opinion, we will
have to look in one of the county clerk's offices in Texas. We mightjust as well have to
look in Oregon, Maine, California or Mexico, and then consult every preacher in Ar-
kansas to see if he had performed such a marriage in this State on a license issued in
some other state. No record of such a ceremonial marriage in Arkansas on a license
from another state could be found in any county courthouse in Arkansas.
Id. at 885-86(McFaddin,J., dissenting).
96. Marriages Pursuant to a License Issued in Alabama Must Be Solemnized in Ala-
bama to Be Valid, Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-00144 (1999), available at http://
www.ago.alabama.gov/pdfopinions/99-00144.pdf (finding that marriages performed pursu-
ant to an Alabama marriage license must be performed in Alabama to be valid); see also
Justice Court Judge's Authority to Perform Marriage Ceremonies, Miss. Att'y Gen. Op.
2001-0475 (2001), 2001 WL 1725322 (finding that a justice could not perform a marriage
ceremony pursuant to a non-state issued marriage license). Contra Validity of Marriage Un-
der Certain Conditions, Ark. Att'y Gen. Op. 96-183 (1996), 1996 WL 375948 (finding a valid
marriage where the couple used an Arkansas marriage license for a marriage performed in
Italy); Validity of a Marriage Performed Outside of Tennessee Pursuant to a License Issued
by a Tennessee County Clerk, Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 85-189 (1985), 1985 WL 193738 (finding
that a Tennessee marriage license does not have to be used within the state of Tennessee).
97. Barbosa-Johnson v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
provisions of the marriage evasion statute permit an Arizona marriage license to be used
anywhere in the world); In re Petition for Compulsory Accounting in Estate of Farraj, No.
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particularly striking example of this tendency, an Arizona case,
Barbosa-Johnson v. Johnson," held that the provisions of the marriage
evasion statute permit an Arizona marriage license to be used any-
where in the world. Despite this ruling, the conceptual divide
persists in the common understandings of Arizona officials, who
continue to inform the public, on websites and by telephone, that
an Arizona marriage license is only valid for use within Arizona.99
Finally, statutes occasionally extend forgiveness for past, or even
prospective, use of the state's marriage license outside the state.1w
B. Notable Exceptions and Variations
Common law marriage and proxy marriages are notable excep-
tions to this general structure, demonstrating that our legal
traditions do not have a fixed commitment to any one form of
marriage procedure and suggesting that numerous forms are con-
sistent with the regulatory purposes of marriage.
1. Common Law Marriage
Common law marriage is the exception to the requirement for
couples to follow state statutes that set up the exclusive means for a
couple to obtain the status of marriage under state law. A common
law marriage does not involve a marriage license or a ceremony.
Couples begin to hold themselves out as husband and wife after
they mutually agree to the marriage and begin living together as a
married couple. Only a few states still recognize common law mar-
riage but many states recognize common law marriages validly
contracted elsewhere even though such marriages could not be
4803/07, 2009 WL 997481 (N.Y. Stir. Ct. Apr. 14, 2009) (holding that a religious ceremony
in New Jersey entered into without a license was a marriage solemnized tinder New York
marriage law).
98. 851 P.2d 866.
99. Information on the internet, supposedly provided by the Clerk of the Superior
Court of Maricopa County, states that "[t]he marriage license is valid for one year, and can
only be used within the State of Arizona."Judy Hedding, How to Obtain a Alarriage License in
Amona, ABouT.com, http://phoenix.abouLcom/cs/weddings/ht/marriagelicense.htm (last
visited October 17, 2009).
100. TENN. CODE ANN. 36-3-103 (c)(1) (2005) ("If a license issued by a county clerk in
Tennessee is used to solemnize a marriage outside Tennessee, such marriage and parties,
their property and their children shall have the same status as if the marriage were solem-
nized in this state."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-37-1 (2006) (stating that even if a Virginia license is
used in a marriage outside of Virginia, the marriage has the status as if it were performed in
Virginia); see abo TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103 (2005) (validating all marriages "occurring
prior to May 2, 1989" using Tennessee licenses outside the Tennessee).
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contracted locally.'' In the handful of states that retain common
law marriage, the doctrine is sometimes used to recognize a mar-
riage in which the ceremony failed for lack of compliance with the
statutes.o 2 In addition, courts in states that do not recognize com-
mon law marriage sometimes stretch doctrine to recognize
common law marriages of couples who reside there.'03 Party control
over marriage appears in different eras and thus reinforces the
contract element in marriage and the pressure for the state to ad-
just its ground rules for status recognition in ways that give effect to
couple autonomy.
2. Proxy Marriage and Other Distance Marriages
A few jurisdictions, under specific circumstances,o4 recognize
marriage ceremonies in which proxies substitute for one or both
members of the marriage.'O Proxy marriage demonstrates the per-
ennial need for both ritual and flexibility in marriage
solemnizing.'0 6 Further, proxy marriage is a demonstration that
101. Aaron Larson, Common Law Marriage, EXPERTLAW (Aug. 2003), http://
www.expertlaw.com/library/familylaw/commonlaw.html (describing the process of com-
mon law marriage and listing the states that recognize them); see aso TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.401 (West 2006) (describing the requirements of an informal marriage).
102. Larson, supra note 101.
103. Renshaw v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding a valid common law mar-
riage for a New York couple that had traveled through Pennsylvania, a common law
marriage jurisdiction, approximately eight times in twenty-one years and had cohabited
tinder the reputation of being a married couple); Blaw-Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris,
596 A.2d 679 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (finding a valid thirty-eight year common law mar-
riage for a Maryland couple that spent two nights at a hotel in Pennsylvania where they had
the reputation of being married and cohabited); Katebi v. Hooshiari, 732 N.YS.2d 382 (App.
Div. 2001) (finding a valid common law marriage for a New York couple who had traveled
through Pennsylvania and Georgia holding themselves out as husband and wife at various
times during their relationship); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 617 N.Y.S.2d 903 (App. Div. 1994)
(finding a valid common law marriage for a New York couple who spent eleven days in
Pennsylvania during their twenty-five year relationship during which they held themselves
out as husband and wife); In lie Claim of Coney v. R.S.R. Corp., 563 N.Y.S.2d 211 (App. Div.
1990) (finding a valid common law marriage where the couple had traveled through Geor
gia, a state recognizing common law marriages, for three days); State v. Phelps, 652 N.E.2d
1032 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding a valid common law marriage in part based on evidence
of Islamic ceremonies as well as holding out).
104. See supra note 25 (listing statutes).
105. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006 (West 2005) (allowing for a single proxy to apply for
the marriage license with an affidavit from the party to be married and allowing for double
proxy where the couple are both on active duty or both in correctional facilities); id. § 2.007
(describing the affidavit to be submitted for the proxy representation); id. § 2.203 (stating
that a proxy can appear at the ceremony for the absent party).
106. Canon law in the Roman Catholic Church recognized proxy marriage and contin-
ties to do so. The principal must write, if possible, explicitly giving his or her proxy authority
to marry. This commission must be made before the pastor, other Church functionary, or
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presence within a territorial boundary is a legal habit that can be,
has been, and continues to be dispensed with.
The form has persisted in the United States in five states, for un-
clear reasons. Several states still permit it but mainly extend it to
members of the armed services on active duty.' For example, Cali-
fornia, Montana, and Texas extend the privilege of single proxy
marriage to members of the armed services on active duty (Cali-
fornia requires an armed conflict) without regard to their being a
resident of the state.' Montana permits double proxy marriage to
be used, but only if one member of the couple is a resident of
Montana or a member of the U.S. military on active duty., Mon-
tana's greater liberalism of authorizing double proxy marriage may
be a result of its history of all-male mining camps. Delaware allows
proxy marriage for the moribund."o
In addition, courts have recognized proxy marriage for immigra-
tion status. For instance, in Aznar v. Commissioner of Immigration, a
federal district court recognized, for immigration purposes, a
proxy marriage between a New York resident and a resident of
two witnesses. See William E Cahill, Historical Notes on the Canon Law on Solemnized Marriage, 2
CATH. LAW. 108, 109 n.3 (1956); see aLyo PoMoNIus, DIGEST, XXII, 2, 5, cited in Lorenzen,
supra note 28, at 473.
In addition to canon-law recognition, the royalty and nobility of Europe used proxy mar-
riage. Among the examples are Clovis with Clotilde, Joanna of Navarre with Henry IV of
England, Anne of Brittany with Archduke Maximilian, Margaret of Anjou with Henry VI of
England, Princess Anne with James I of England, Queen Mary Tudor with Philip II of Spain,
and Napoleon and Marie-Louise. High nobility sometimes used proxy marriage as well, as
with the Duke of York marrying Mary Beatrice of Modena in 1673. T.F. THISELTON-DYER,
ROYALTY IN ALL AGES: THE AMUSEMENTS, ECCENTRICITIES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SUPERSTI-
TIONS, AND FROLICS OF THE KINGS AND QUEENS OF EUROPE 310-14 (1903).
We are not aware of a scholarly explanation of why European royalty was so attached to
this form of solemnizing marriage. We speculate that proxy marriage provided greater flexi-
bility for political maneuver, as such marriages were de facto political alliances. A proxy
marriage could be easily annulled for lack of consummation permitting parties to back out
of the deal if necessary. Indeed, the historical record is filled with several such annulments.
Further, proxy marriages could be performed immediately, without the time-consuming
preparations and elaborate ceremonies that royal weddings perforce required. They could
"seal a deal" immediately, if political exigencies so required.
Regardless of the reasons for proxy marriages, European governments appear to have
been attached to them, keeping them legal for royalty even as they made them illegal for
everyone else. In the late nineteenth century, when Germany and Italy each united the
country and promulgated national civil codes, their marriage law provision set forth manda-
tory marriage procedures prohibiting proxy marriage, but both codes explicitly exempted
their royal houses. See Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 478. Similarly, the 1754 Hardwicke Act
exempted the British royal family from its mandatory procedure. Geo. II., c. 33, cl. 17-18.
107. See supra note 25.
108. See sufna note 25.
109. See sura note 25. The usual assumption is that the member of the military is de-
ployed away from his normal domicile.
110. See supra note 25. Delaware's law is a single-proxy statute, where one of the parties
is near death.
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Spain under the lex loci celebrationis maxim."' As U.S. DistrictJudge
Lowell said in the Suzanna case, "If royalty could do it, why may not
those of more common clay be allowed to follow their example." 1 2
The availability of proxy marriage statutes does not appear to be
widely known, although some efforts seem to be emerging to offer
proxy services through commercial solicitation of couples who do
not have any previous connection with a state."' Because of the
general understanding that marriage is associated with the pres-
ence of a couple in the state that authorizes the marriage, Montana
officials became uneasy about the extent to which couples with no
connection to Montana were using an earlier version of the stat-
ute."' Concern prompted the Montana legislature to change the
law.115
Experience over time shows countries and states have allowed
proxy marriage when the exigencies of the time require it. During
wartime, various countries explicitly authorized absentee marriage.
The Belgian law of May 30, 1916, provides that "[d]uring the dura-
tion of the war either or both of the parties may appear before the
officer of the civil status either in person or by a special and
111. United States ex rel. Aznar v. Comm'r of Immigration, 298 F. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1924);
Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713 (D. Mass. 1924).
112. Suzanna, 295 F. at 716; see also THISELTON-DYER, supra note 106, at 310-14 (provid-
ing examples of proxy marriages involving royalty). A striking contemporary example is the
proxy marriage, under Mexican law, of Roberto Rossellini and Ingrid Bergman. See DONALD
SpoTo, NOTORIOUS: THE LIFE OF INGRID BERGMAN 300 (2001) (quoting Bergman as saying,
"Of course, we were very sorry not to be present at our own wedding ... but that doesn't
make it count any the less for us").
113. See, e.g., MARRIAGE BY PROXY, http://www.marriagebyproxy.com/ (last visited Apr.
14, 2011) (offering a double proxy in Montana for military service members and a single
proxy in Colorado, which does not require military service nor residency).
114. Possley, supra note 28 ("The purpose of the bill was for the military, and there was
a fear that it was being abused. The intention was to modify the law without shutting the
door to its highest intentions. Inquiries have come from all [over] the world .... There
were hundreds and hundreds of requests for information. We decided the law needed to be
amended to make it clear and eliminate ambiguity, although I am not sure how Montana
has the authority to issue marriage licenses for an entirely foreign jurisdiction." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Dan Barry, Trading Vows in Montana, No Couple Required, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at All, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/us/
101and.html?_r-1 ("'We were getting calls from Turkey and the Middle East,' recalls Peg
Allison, the tolerant district court clerk here in Flathead County. 'From people who were
definitely not citizens of the United States, and had nothing to do with the military.'").
115. The newly limiting portion of the Montana statute is in Section 40-1-301 (4):
One party to a proxy marriage must be a member of the armed forces of the United
States on federal active duty or a resident of Montana at the time of application for a
license and certificate pursuant to 40-1-202. One party or a legal representative shall
appear before the clerk of court and pay the marriage license fee. For the purposes
of this subsection, residency must be determined in accordance with 1-1-215.
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).
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authentic power of attorney."' 16 France and Italy provided for simi-
lar laws."'7 Similarly, as discussed above, many jurisdictions in the
United States continue to recognize proxy marriage. It is worth
noting that during World War II, Minnesota had a law authorizing
proxy marriage.' 8
Beyond proxy marriage in which there is, in fact, a physical per-
son (the "proxy") present within the authorizing jurisdiction, U.S.
law has authorized the marriages of individuals in distant locations
using telegraph, telephone, or mail. As with proxy marriages, the
exigencies of war played a role in distance marriage, with soldiers,
who either faced a high probability of death (and thus wanted to
settle death benefits on intimate partners) or left pregnant part-
ners at the homefront."5
Unfortunately, good statistics about the prevalence of telephone
marriage are not available. We know it existed largely from news-
paper and other accounts. 120 A law review comment, written in
1946, describes the need of servicemen during World War II to
have access to marriage formalization when they could not be pre-
sent for a ceremony.2 ' Beyond noting the prevalence of telephone
marriages, the article recognizes the normative argument for mak-
ing marriage as accessible as possible: "When a state assumes the
authority to prescribe the sole conditions under which its citizens
may assume so basic a relation as that of marriage, it incurs the re-
sponsibility of making certain, in so far as possible, that the
116. Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 479 (citing MASSON, LA LEGISLATION DE GUERRE 146
(1917)). Interestingly, the Roman Catholic Church permits proxy marriage, as discussed
above, but does not recognize (or at least at one time did not recognize) telephone mar-
riage. See Marriage by Phone Out, Rome RulingSnags Romance of Italian Girl and GI., N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1958, at 27.
117. Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 479 (citingDUVERGIER, LA LiGISLATION COMPliTE DES
Lots, ETC. (1915)).
118. 1945 Minn. Laws ch. 409 (allowing marriage proxy for duration of war plus six
months).
119. Weyrauch, supra note 28, at 108-09 (lamenting the licensing trend and suggesting
the need for a safety valve to avoid hardship). Having soldiers stationed abroad during
peacetime began to happen after WWII. Before such regular peacetime stationing of sol-
diers outside the country, wartime was the primary moment the United States sent soldiers
abroad. See Bedi, supra note 8.
120. Marriage by Telephone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1890, at 2; FLORIDA MARRIAGE BY
MAIL, http://www.floridamarriagelicensebymail.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); Mar-
riage License: Apply by Mail, JUDICIAL BRANCH OF ARIZONA, MOJAVE COUNTY, http://
www.mohavecourts.com/clerk/mlpage.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); Phone Marriage,
MARRIAGEToGo.com, http://www.marriagetogo.com/text-content-page 2 .html#phone%2 0
marriage (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); Marine's Widow, Baby in Immigration Limbo, MSNBC.com
(Sept. 17, 2009, 11:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32891829/ns/us.news-life/.
121. See Comment, The Validity ofAbsentee Marriage of Servicemen, supra note 28.
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privilege of marrying is denied only by design, and not by inad-
vertence."122
Similarly, contemporary commenters collected instances of tele-
phone marriages, giving the impression that they were somewhat
common.123 While there were no cases challenging these weddings,
there is some case law concerning proxy marriages in Mexico,
which servicemen and their spouses used in the hope that U.S.
jurisdictions would recognize them. These cases generally upheld
such marriages. 24 In the 1950s, the celebrity couple of Ingrid
Bergman and Roberto Rossellini, facing local barriers to their
122. See id. at 753. The argument likely assumed the person wishing to marry from a dis-
tance had some connection to the state. But in the nature of marriage law, if one state made
distance military marriage possible and the accommodation was for the needs of the mili-
tary, states might find it easy enough to allow a soldier to use the law if his fianc6e traveled to
the state. Given the willingness of states to allow short-term visits to marry, any individual
state, to which a soldier could travel to marry in peacetime, might wish to be just as accessi-
ble to him and to his partner when he cannot travel because of war. Today, with a stronger
awareness of Equal Protection principles in government's treatment of all persons, a state
might well wish to serve constitutional values of equal access that are denied or ignored
elsewhere. That is, a state could be sensitive to the fact that those who have the right to trav-
el to the state to marry are barred by the demands of military service from doing so and be
spurred to open access (since collectively states monopolize marriage access and have fairly
uniform rules demanding the physical presence of the couple). See Mae Kuykendall, Export-
ing Ceremonial Marriage: Constitutional Considerations (unpublished draft) (on file with
the author). To rewrite the sentence in light of such considerations: "If states assume the
authority to prescribe exclusive state-administered rules for marriage access and do so al-
most uniformly, they incur the common responsibility, which can be fulfilled by the action of
one state, of making certain, in so far as possible, that the privilege of marrying is denied
only by design, and not by inadvertence." Note that Montana already offers double proxy
marriage to members of the military, without a requirement of a prior connection to Mon-
tana. See supra note 115.
123. According to a student comment written shortly after World War II, the most
common means for absentee marriages were proxy or telephone ceremonies, or contracts,
signed by proxy or exchanged by mail. See Comment, The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Ser-
vicemen, supra note 28, at 735 n.1 (citing O'Neill, Most Married Man in America, YANK, Oct. 5,
1945, at 11; Reynolds, Where Theres a Will There's a Wedding, N.Y. SUNDAY NEWS, Sept. 3, 1944,
at 23-29; KAN. CIrY STAR, Mar. 4, 1946, p. 3, col. 2 (noting an attorney's fiftieth appearance
as proxy in ceremony); N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1945, § 4, at 2 (noting the twenty-fourth Tulsa
proxy wedding)). "Sporadic instances of absentee marriage occurred during World War I."
Id. (citing N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1917, at 7 (telephone); N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1918, at 11 (tele-
graph); N.Y. TIMEs, June 22, 1918, at 9 (telegraph)). Interestingly, as the student comment
points out, the Judge Advocate General of the Army suggested advocated soldiers should
have access to marriage by mail. See id. That same comment pointed out that the Attorney
General of Florida, while not recognizing the validity of common law marriages, had ruled
that marriage by telephone is valid. Id. at 748.
124. Hardin v. Davis, 16 Ohio Supp. 19 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1945) ("Having found that the
parties in the instant case intended to be and were legally married by proxy in Mexico, that
there was no fraud in connection with their marriage, and that the resulting marriage status
of the parties is not contrary to Ohio law or its public policy, the Court, therefore, finds,
declares, orders and decrees that Laura Mae Hardin, the plaintiff, and Walter Lloyd Davis
the defendant, were legally married atJuarez, Mexico, on May 8, 1944."). See generally Stern,
supra note 28.
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marriage in Italy, availed themselves of the proxy marriage proce-
dures in Mexico.' 5 The marriage was reported in the American
press as a genuine marriage.
The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld distance marriage conducted
by letter in the celebrated case, Great Northern Railway v. Johnson.26
There, the husband was from Minnesota and the wife from Mis-
127
souri. At that time, both states recognized common law marriage,
which required no formality or solemnization. It is arguable that
Great Northern Railway did not reach the question of whether the
state-required rituals could be performed distantly. On the other
hand, though, the case stood for party autonomy. It held that,
without explicit statutory authorization , the parties had the right
to effectuate a marriage using basic contractual principles.
So deeply embedded has been the precedent of proxy marriage
as a path to a recognized marriage that the eminent Edward Lo-
renzen argued during the end of the First World War that proxy
and other distance marriage conducted over the telephone (dis-
cussed below) would be legal in the United States. He shows that
proxy marriage was perfectly legal in England prior to passage of
the Hardwicke Act, citing inter alia, Swinburne's Treatise on Espous-
als.'" Asserting (a bit heroically) that the American colonies
"accepted the then prevailing view that a marriage de presenti with-
out a religious ceremony constituted a perfect marriage,"
Lorenzen argues that proxy marriage was part of the common law
on marriage that the colonies adopted. Thus, the traditions that
many imagine are embodied in licensing rules and consequent
conventions actually supersede, in this scholar's view, a much
deeper tradition that enabled couples to marry despite geographic
separation.
Finally, in a form of distance marriage, Massachusetts currently
has an elaborate statute allowing a person who was a Massachusetts
resident at the time of a foreign marriage ceremony, if later resid-
125. SeeSPoTo, supra note 112.
126. 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918).
127. Ann Laquer Estin, Golden Anniversary Reflections: Changes In Marriage After Fifty Years,
42 FAM. L.Q. 333, 336 n.23 (2008) ("Ten states and the District of Columbia still recognize
common-law marriages: Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Texas.").
128. Licensing has tended to preclude other means of getting married, thus limiting
the value of the case as a precedent. The case remains instructive about the authority of a
state to allow marriage by long distance. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1060 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining "common-law marriage" as "[a] marriage taking legal effect without license or
ceremony only when two people who are capable of marriage, live together as husband and
wife with the intention of being married and hold themselves out to others as being mar-
ried").
129. Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 478.
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ing anywhere in the United States, to file evidence of the marriage
with a Massachusetts clerk or registrar.so This seems to be a con-
venience that allows for transferring to an American state,
Massachusetts, the official record of a marriage that might lack for
good record keeping outside the country. Massachusetts thereby
serves in retrospect as the official "host" of the marriage solemniza-
tion. It has some echoes of our proposal, in that Massachusetts
perceived the need of its marriage procedure-its record keep-
ing-to be made available for those who married outside the
Commonwealth.
Part of the resistance to distance marriage may emerge from a
misunderstanding of the old legal chestnut, lex loci celebrationis. This
legal rule holds that jurisdictions should rely on the law of the state
in which the marriage was celebrated to determine its validity, ex-
cept if a strong public policy exception exists. This principle
applies to domestic recognition of marriages performed in other
states,"' as well as international recognition of marriages performed
in other nation states.13 2 For example, Nebraska recognizes a mar-
riage performed in California under valid California law and
procedure, even though Nebraska specifies different procedures for
valid marriage. On the other hand, Nebraska does not recognize a
130. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 36 (West 2007).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 283 (1971).
132. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Polygamy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L.J. 471, 474 (1923)
("As regards marriage, our courts have said that under our conditions it is convenient to
determine its validity according to the law of the place of celebration. In the case of foreign
marriages also they appear to deem it expedient to apply the lex loci celebrationis."). See
generally Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Fom Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1151, 1209 (2000) ("Marriages are typically considered valid everywhere if they
are valid in the state of celebration."). Some states have explicit statutory provisions that
blend their marriage evasion law with the recognition afforded to marriages under the prin-
ciple of lex loci celebrationis. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-28 (2005) ("All marriages in
which one or both parties are citizens of this state, celebrated in a foreign country, shall be
valid, provided (1) Each party would have legal capacity to contract such marriage in this
state and the marriage is celebrated in conformity with the law of that country."). Massachu-
setts has a stand-alone marriage statute that declares void evasive marriages. MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 207, § 10 (West 2007). The elaborate statute-discussed supra note 130 and
accompanying text-is not a lex loci celebrationis provision, which Massachusetts was not
moved to restate in statute but seemingly assumes as a given. Rather, it functions as an offer
by Massachusetts to serve in retrospect as the official "host" of the marriage solemnization.
Our proposal has the merit of making it possible for a ceremony of marriage performed
anywhere in the world by an American citizen to be an official act in an American state, with
its attendant public record keeping. We note, in addition, that our proposal can also support
improved state record keeping of marriages, as well as the compilation of comprehensive
statistics on patterns of marriage.
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California same-sex marriage, or a Saudi Arabian polygamous mar-
riage, under the public policy exception.'
The lex loci celebrationis maxim contains a certain syllogism: if
marriage is validly performed in X jurisdiction, then Yjurisdiction
must recognize it. However, committing the logical error of negat-
ing the antecedent, many in the debate, either implicitly or
explicitly, draw an erroneous corollary: if a marriage performed in
X is not valid and authorized in X, then Y jurisdiction must not
recognize it-even if the marriage would be a valid marriage if per-
formed in Y. For the many lulled by this faulty reasoning, a
jurisdiction only has power to determine what constitutes a valid
marriage if performed within its territory, and as a corollary, it has
no power to authorize marriages anywhere else.M
This corollary is wrong on more than mere formal, logical
grounds. First, states historically have never assumed marriage as a
matter of exclusive regulatory control. 3 5 The history of marriage
133. The public policy exception is reinforced by DOMA. See Defense of Marriage Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1738(C) (2010). Section 3 of DOMA reaffirmed the principle that states did not
have to recognize out-of-state marriages that violated public policy:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be re-
quired to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.
Id. For an argument that the public policy exception in the conflict of laws doctrine allows
state courts to rule same-sex marriages as invalid without reliance upon DOMA, see Larry
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106
YALE L.J. 1965, 1975-76 (1997).
Nothing we propose would alter the non-recognition of a same-sex marriage by Nebraska.
We are only concerned that other states accept the procedure by which a marriage that is
satisfactory under their public policy for marriage substance is formalized. We do not pro-
pose to force recognition of marriages in any jurisdiction that rejects a marriage under its
public policy exception, but only to make access to the formalization of a marriage available
at a distance. That marriage would then be recognized in any jurisdiction that recognizes
the type of marriage it is.
134. Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-00144, supra note 96 (advising addressee that "Alabama
lacks any authority to license activities that occur outside her borders" and a "ceremony
performed [using an Alabama marriage license] in Tennessee was not a valid solemnization
under Alabama law"). Our syllogism is consistent with the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 283 cmt.i. -("Marriage which does -not meetthe require-
ments of the state where it was contracted. Upholding the validity of a marriage is, as stated
in Comment b, a basic policy in all states. The fact that a marriage does not comply with the
requirements of the state where it was contracted should not therefore inevitably lead to the
conclusion that the marriage is invalid.").
135. As shown above, the Church originally defined marriage, and English law (the
Hardwick Act) defined marriage in terms of Church law. See infra Section III. In the United
States, the colonies/states were varied in their involvement with marriage and reliance on
religious definitions. See infra Section III.
SUMMER 2011] Modernizing Marriage 767
licensing, despite the confusing term "license,"136 which despite its
ecclesiastical origin suggests state regulatory control, is a story of
religious heterogeneity and state reception towards a multitude of
marriage solemnization rituals, particularly in the United States.
Second, states have always authorized and sanctioned marriage
performed outside of their territorial borders through such mech-
anisms as proxy, mail, and telephone marriages.13
In short, distance marriage, whether by mail or telephone, with
or without proxy, has legal precedent in this country. This prece-
dent's strength proceeds from the logic of marriage: it is essentially
a party-driven agreement that the state sanctions and enables. De-
scribed this way, marriage obviously can be performed without
both parties' physical presence in any one place. Territorial mo-
nopolies persist from legal inertia and legally simplistic institutions
that go unchallenged.
III. PAST REGULATORY GOALS
The previous section portrays an elaborate machinery to regu-
late marriage formation that, despite its widespread rigidity,
demonstrates tremendous flexibility at times. This reflects the lack
of any clear regulatory purpose to modern marriage procedure. As
we demonstrate, modem marriage procedure simply reflects anti-
quated goals and lacks a purpose appropriate for the twenty-first
century. At best, present-day statutes give the illusion of a rational
framework, carefully designed to reflect deeply felt values that re-
main vital today. Instead, statutes today constitute the fossilized
relic of the transient and forgotten accretions of abandoned regu-
latory aims. -
136. The Massachusetts marriage code avoids using the term "license," instead provid-
ing for the filing of "a notice of intention of marriage" and calling for a certificate signed by
the clerk or registrar "specifying the date when notice was filed with him and all the facts
relative to the marriage which are required by law to be ascertained and recorded." MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 207, § 28 (West 2007). Massachusetts's statutory usage recognizes lin-
guistically the party control over the marriage and the role of the Commonwealth as a
facilitator, recorder, and source of publicity: the Code of the Commonwealth treats the mari-
tal formalization as something more like the filing of a copyright or a land tide than like an
application for a patent. While Massachusetts enforces some outside limits on providing the
certificate, they are the extreme instances of tender age and being party to an existing mar-
riage.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28; supra Section II.B.2.
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A. Religious Regulation of Marriage: Banns'Notice and Publicity
Throughout the Middle Ages and into early modem Europe,
both civil and ecclesiastical law recognized that a valid marriage
did not require any type of church ceremony or state involve-
ment."8 Following established teaching, both the Church and the
state recognized that mere stated consent of the parties creates a
marriage or, to be legally precise, consent made in the present
tense (per verba de praesenti) in contrast to words expressing a future
intention to marry.'
While marriage per verba de praesenti was valid, it was considered
"clandestine" or "irregular" in comparison to properly sanctioned
marriage performed by a clergyman in a church. Despite the cen-
trality of consent, the Church had rules on marriage eligibility. The
purpose was dual. Parties should be capable and sincere in giving
their consent. Also of importance, the Church sought to prevent
bigamy and incest. The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215'4 officially
set forth the "triple calling of banns"-i.e., the wedding was an-
nounced at church on the three Sundays prior to the marriage."'
The ceremony had to be performed by a priest, in the presence of
witnesses-and it had to be performed during certain days and
138. See R. B. OUTHWAITE, CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1850, at 2
(1995) ("'Consent in the present tense was almost universally accepted by canonists after
the late 1180s as the critical test of whether a marriage existed or not.'" (quoting JA.
BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 268-69 (1987)); LYNN D. WARDLE & LAU-
RENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 141 (2002); see also
OuTHwArrE, supra, at 269 ("This was the official view echoed in later civil law and it was
supported by the common law ... [as evidenced by] ChiefJustice Holt'sjudgment in Collins
v. Jesson in 1704 that if a contract be per verba de praesenti, it amounts to an actual marriage
which the very parties themselves cannot dissolve by release or other mutual agreement, for
it is as much a marriage in the sight of God as if it had been in facie ecclesia."); Joseph N.
Perry, The Canonical Concept of Marital Consent: Roman Law Influences, 25 CATH. LAw. 228, 233
(1980) ("From this point on [the reign of Pope Alexander III in the twelfth century], it
became a matter of Church doctrine that, at the most fundamental level, consent alone
creates Christian marriage in iure.").
According to Outhwaite, common law lawyers encouraged by the Statute of Frauds of
1677 began to insist upon some writing in proof of marriage. OUTHWAITE, supra, at 2.
139. John E. Semonche, Common-Law Marriage in North Carolina: A Study in Legal History,
9 Am.J. LEGAL HIST. 320, 321 (1965).
140. Id.
141. Banns had hitherto been traditional in many Christian countries. OUTHWAITE, SU-
pra note 138, at 4. The Church set forth other requirements, such as stipulations concerning
where and when marriages should take place, registration of marriage, and parental consent
for marriages of minors. Id.
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times."' Individuals had to swear to matters concerning appropri-
ate age and/or parental consent and provide a security bond.4 3
The Church's adoption of rules of marriage formation had clear
regulatory goals. Clandestine marriage created opportunities for
bigamy and even incestuous marriage, which calling of the banns
was meant to counter. Perhaps more important, clandestine mar-
riage disrupted inheritance, as children could marry without
parental consent or even their parents' knowledge." Both civil and
ecclesiastical law, while accepting marriage per verba de praesenti,
treated it less favorably than properly sanctioned marriage. In Eng-
land, "more than thirty sets of canons and diocesan statutes
attempted to ensure that English marriages were conducted in
ways that the church approved of."'4 5 Most severe, "those not mar-
rying in the approved manner, and those who assisted them, were
liable to punishments that ranged from repeated whippings to ex-
communication."'4  Similarly, English civil law treated marriages
solemnized irregularly at a disadvantage. For instance, the com-
mon lawyers, fearing that any woman could claim a secret marriage
with a recently deceased man, forbade women not married in a
legal church wedding from enjoying full inheritance rights.'4 7 Se-
cret marriages could evade censorious community opinion that
might oppose them and, having done so, were not subject to clear
proof.
The Council of Trent in 1564 abolished recognition of
clandestine marriage in all Catholic countries, requiring all
legitimate ecclesiastical marriage to be performed before a priest
and with witnesses." The Council grandfathered existing irregular
142. Rebecca Probert, Control over Marriage in England and Wales, 1753-1823: The Clan-
destine Marriages Act of 1753 in Context, 27 LAW & HIST. REv. 413, 418-19 (2009).
143. Id. (citing THE ANGLICAN CANONS, 1529-1947 (Gerald Bray ed., 1998)).
144. Id. at 431-37 (discussing the use by wealthy parents of conditions on property in
restraint of marriage without consent). The playwright Horton Foote provides a touching
early twentieth century American account of his parents' marriage over the objection of his
mother's parents. See HORTON FOOTE, FAREWELL: A MEMOIR OF A TEXAS CHILDHOOD 18
(1999). Albert Horton Foote and Harriet Gautier Brooks, both of Wharton, Texas, sneaked
over to a nearby Texas town called El Campo, got a license, and came back to Wharton,
where a minister married them in a house six blocks from Harriet's parents' house. Id. They
set up housekeeping in Wharton and were snubbed by her parents until the day her mother
called and said, "I thought I'd come over to see you this afternoon if you're going to be
home." Id. Her mother had yielded to the hardy practice of couple autonomy. Id.; see also
Mae Kuykendall, Marriage Procedure, THE CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://
www.theconglomerate.org/2010/04/marriage-procedure.html.
145. OUTHWAITE, supra note 138, at 5.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 5 (citing F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 374
(2nd ed. 1989)).
148. Id.
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marriages-an early example of legal presumption in favor of
existing marriages."' In Catholic countries, this shift in
ecclesiastical law ended further irregular marriage and any civil
recognition of such marriages.5
Because Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church in the
1530s, several decades before the Council of Trent, England never
adopted the Council's reforms and only eliminated clandestine
marriage in 1753 with passage of the Hardwicke Act.'" Clandestine
marriage persisted, therefore, in England for two centuries, exist-
ing alongside regular Church marriage which took place according
to the ecclesiastical law of the Anglican Church.' Whether the
American colonies received clandestine marriage, therefore, is an
open question.12
B. Special Procedures for the Elite
Many couples, seeking to marry legitimately within the Church,
sought to escape banns' residency and publication burdens. From
at least the fourteenth century, bishops in England did grant li-
censes, permitting marriage without banns.5 4 Presumably using his
judgment and knowledge of his own parishioner's status, truthful-
ness, and respectability, the bishop or his delegate would issue a
marriage license. Typically, the bishops would only have power to
issue licenses within their bishopric or diocese.
Thus, the Church, not the state, issued the first marriage licens-
es. They no doubt provided a fashionable escape, a First Class, as it
were, in marriage screening. But, the regulatory purpose remained
the same-the Church provided notice and publicity, as well as sat-
isfying itself that the marriage was willing and voluntary and that
the couples were otherwise eligible.
149. THE COUNCIL OF TRENT: THE CANONS AND DECREES OF THE SACRED AND OECU-
MENICAL COUNCIL OF TRENT 192-232 (J. Waterworth ed. & trans, London, Dolman 1848),
available at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/trentall.html.
150. See Perry, supra note 138, at 229-32.
151. OUTHWAITE, supra note 138, at 5; see also Hardwicke Act, Geo. II, c. 33 (1754).
152. OuTrrHwArrE, supra note 138, at 5.
153. See Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 478.
154. Patrick McGrath, Notes on the History of Marriage Licenses, in GLOUCESTER MARRIAGE
ALLEGATIONS 1627-1680, at xx, xx-xxi (B. Firth ed., 1954). While McGrath notes that "the
first canonical enactment ... seems to be the eleventh canon of the Synod of Westminster in
1200, when it was ordered that no marriage should be contracted without banns being
thrice published in the Church, except by special authority of the bishop," it appears that
there is no historical record of licenses, in fact, being granted until the fourteenth century.
Id. at xx & n.4.
770 [VOL. 44:4
Modernizing Marriage
C. The State Take Over (or Delegation to the Anglican Church)
of Marriage in England
The 1753 Hardwicke Act ended legal recognition of clandestine
marriage in England, giving civil recognition only to "regular"
marriage performed according to Anglican ecclesiastical law as it
then existed-i.e., through either banns or licenses and following
the various, often odd, procedural rules concerning residency,
time, and day.'"5 Only a bishop and those vested with his authority
could provide licenses.'"6 In addition, a couple could obtain a spe-
cial license from a bishop, which would allow marriage anywhere
within the bishopric, or from the Archbishop of Canterbury, which
would allow one to marry anywhere in the Kingdom. These "spe-
cial licenses" had some social cachet due to their expense and the
status they conveyed. 5 7 Interestingly, the Act made exceptions for
Jews, Quakers, and the royal family-groups that either could not
marry in an Anglican church or, as with the royal family, had mar-
riages that for political reasons had to be more flexible, requiring,
at times, marriage by proxy or outside the country.1 5 1 Catholics and
dissenters were not exempted, an artifact of anti-Catholic bias not
remedied until the nineteenth century. 59 Anglo-American law has
long used marriage law to discriminate against minorities.
As the license evolved into a vehicle for state regulation of mar-
riage, there emerged a conventional legal assumption (still much
with us) that the state has licensing authority over marriage based
on territorial boundaries, just as a bishop's licensing authority was
155. The strange procedural rules included specific times and days when marriage
could be performed, as readers of Thomas Hardy will recall: luckless Fanny Robin from Far
from the Madding Crowd was late to her planned wedding to Frank Troy and could not be
married that day. These peculiar rules have stayed with us, as the previous section shows,
reflected in the odd procedural requirements states continue to enforce.
156. Geo. II., c. 33, cl. 17-18.
157. Id. at sec. 6; see ab5oJANE AUSTEN, PRIDE & PREJUDICE 341 (Courage Classics ed.,
1992) (Mrs. Bennet to Elizabeth upon recently hearing of her marriage to Darcy: "'My
dearest child,' she cried, 'I can think of nothing else! Ten thousand a year, and very likely
more! Tis as good as a Lord! And a special licence. You must and shall be married by a spe-
cial licence. But my dearest love, tell me what dish Mr. Darcy is particularly fond of, that I
may have it tomorrow.'").
158. Geo. II., c. 33, cl. 17-18. Interestingly, when Germany and Italy adopted national
codes governing marriage solemnization, they also made exemptions for their ruling hous-
es. See Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 478.
159. In the 1830s, Parliament passed bills allowing justices of the peace to license mar-
riage and eliminated the Anglican monopoly on religious solemnization. Parliament,
however, maintained Church authority to marry by banns. OUTHWAiTE, supra note 138, at
164.
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limited to his diocese.'" The preceding discussion questions this
idea. Under the Hardwicke Act, the English Parliament chose to
recognize marriages performed in a certain way (i.e., with banns or
Church licensed); it did not suggest that its own power to authorize
marriage was limited to its borders.
D. The Patchwork Emergence of Marriage Law in the United States
The American colonies were, with the exception of Georgia,
founded in the seventeenth century, a time during which English
marriage law was in flux, with clandestine marriage still recognized
but its precise legal status unclear.'6 ' As a result, the colonies had
freedom to craft laws to suit their own religion and social structure.
Because the 1753 Hardwicke Act did not apply to the English pos-
sessions overseas (or Scotland or Ireland), the American colonies
maintained that freedom until the Revolution.' 2 Even more im-
portant, the traditional Anglican form of "regular" marriage simply
did not make sense in the colonies. After all, many of the colonists,
like New England's Puritans or Pennsylvania's Quakers, were colo-
nists because they did not want to be Anglican, a desire that they
fervently, even fanatically, felt. Their religious and political disposi-
tion led them to reject the Anglican form of solemnization. With
the presence of a priest, a church wedding appeared too close to
the Catholic sacrament of marriage. Further, even colonists who
lacked hostility towards the Anglican Church faced the practical
problem that in the newly and sparsely populated colonies there
163
often were no Anglican clergy available to solemnize marriages.
The colonies, therefore, devised diverse legal solutions to the
problem of creating "regular" marriages that differed according to
their religious and social organizations&I For instance, the Puri-
tans of Massachusetts, likely reacting against the Catholic view of
marriage as a sacrament, argued that marriage needed no priestly
160. See Marc R. Poirier, Gender Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same&ex Marriage?, 3 FIU
L. REV. 307, 317-18 (2008) (asking "Where is same-sex marriage?" and providing several
geographic answers, including "Massachusetts, Connecticut, and until recently California"
and "[m]uch of Western Europe").
161. See supra text accompanying notes 138-147.
162. Hardwicke Act, Geo. II., c. 33, sec. 18.
163. Semonche, supra note 139, at 326. ("Notice that provisions for a civil ceremony re-
sult, not from the Puritan view that marriage is a civil right that should be regulated by the
state, but rather from the practical problem of an absence of clergy.")
164. 2 GEORGE ELLIOTr HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONs 125
(1904) ("The continuity of English law and custom in the New England colonies is not more
striking than the innovation.").
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intermediary.'65 Influenced by the example of the Netherlands,
their previous residence, the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay intro-
duced strictly civil marriage, which involved an appearance before
a judge.i6 This minimal legal transaction dominated marriage sol-
emnization in New England, as every colony viewed "marriage . ..
as a civil contract and the celebration was performed by a civil
magistrate."' New York, originally a Dutch colony, following a
modified Dutch model, allowed either religious or civil ceremo-
nies. When the British took over, their government imposed a
regime similar to the pre-existing Dutch approach, permitting cel-
ebration of marriage before a minister or justice of the peace.'68 In
the Quaker proprietary colonies of Pennsylvania and Delaware, law
reflected the Quaker custom of permitting any type of religious
ceremony but requiring public notice followed by a witnessed mar-
riage ceremony and subsequent registration with a county
registrar."
165. We find far-fetched the assertion that Puritan contractual weddings were in any way
related to New England's current liberal marriage regimes. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage
Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1758, 1794-95 (2005) ("In Puritan New England, by contrast to
the rest of the United States, members of the clergy came late into participation in the li-
censing of marriage .... Marriage in New England was from the start a civil contract
solemnized by a civil magistrate .... It is tempting to see some connection between this
history and New England's vanguard role in the state licensing of same-sex couples . . . .").
Rather, aversion to the Catholic view that marriage was a sacrament no doubt drove the
form of Puritan marriage. Further, it is a mistake to claim that the Puritans, in fact, saw mar-
riage as a private "civil contract." To the contrary, the Puritans believed in strict state control
over marriage. As an early commentator said, although the Puritans regarded marriage as
"purely a civil contractual relation," they insisted that it "be regulated by municipal law
[and] be sanctioned by the civil authority." 2 HOWARD, supra note 164, at 210. Indeed, there
are instances of the purely contractual clandestine marriages, and the Puritan state pun-
ished them. Perhaps most famously, Governor Richard Bellingham in 1641 secretly married
Penelope Pelham and was indicted for the offense. See id. In other words, even though there
was ecclesiastical law determining valid marriage in the Church's eyes, the state always had
to choose what parts of ecclesiastical law were required for a valid marriage in the state's
eyes.
166. 2 HOWARD, supra note 164, at 134. Governor Hutchinson states of the Puritans, "I
believe there was no instance of marriage by a clergyman after they arrived, during their
charter; but it was always done by a magistrate, or by persons specially appointed for that
purposes. It is difficult to assign a reason for so sudden a change, especially as there was no
established form of the marriage covenant." 2 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, HISTORY OF MASSA-
CHUSETTS BAY 392 (Salem, Thomas C. Cushing 1795).
167. 2 HOWARD, supra note 164, at 128-34 ("The law and custom of the other New Eng-
land colonies were essentially the same. Everywhere marriage was regarded as a civil contract
and the celebration was performed by a civil magistrate."). We think it a mistake to view
Puritan marriage as a private contract, as some modern advocates of contract-based mar-
riage suggest. As we discuss below, Puritan marriage rejected the Catholic view that marriage
was a sacrament but always insisted upon strict state control.
168. Id. at 294.
169. Id. at 125.
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In contrast with Quaker liberalism, several southern colonies
adopted rules similar to the 1753 Hardwicke Act in England. In
Virginia, all marriages had to be solemnized by an Anglican minis-
ter, a rule in force until after the Revolution.o Marriage
ceremonies could be performed after publication or license, which
the Governor was empowered to issue.17' North Carolina had a sim-
ilar rule giving the marriage monopoly to Anglican ministers, a
rult that was controversial, of course, among Dissenters, i.e., non-
Anglican Protestants. 2
The strange diversity of marriage regulation at the outset of our
country's history created the groundwork for a confusing patch-
work of regulatory structures for the next 200 years.
E. The Nineteenth Century Turn Towards Licensing as Tool for Enforcing
Discrimination and Advancing Public Health
As in many other areas of law, state marriage formation law
moved towards uniformity throughout the nineteenth century-a
uniformity that characterizes current law, the features of which we
discuss above."' Many of the colonies permitted marriage by li-
censes instead of banns, just as in England."' In the nineteenth
century, most state statutes eliminated banns or public announce-
ment requirements and began to require licensing exclusively.
Licensing emerged as a tool states used to regulate marriage di-
rectly. The states seized the opportunity to transform the
regulation of marriage from minimal self-enforcement to intrusive
government control."' First, many refused licenses on miscegena-
tion grounds, greatly (and undesirably) expanding the narrow
170. It is important to remember that some colonies, and later states, had established
churches. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2110 (2003) (stating that Virginia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia recognized the Anglican Church,
while Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut were Congregationalist
(Puritan)).
171. 2 HOWARD, supra note 164, at 240-47.
172. Semonche, supra note 139, at 319-20.
173. See supra Section II.A.
174. For example, in NewYork, marriage by ".[license 'under the hand and seale of the
governour' in place of banns is still allowed." 2 HOWARD, supra note 164, at 294.
175. The elimination of banns was slow but inexorable. In 1929, Richmond and Hall
counted three states that still permitted banns: Maryland, Ohio, and South Carolina. See
RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 15, at 337 n.I. Other states eliminated banns earlier: Massa-
chusetts in 1850, see The New Marriage Law, CHRISTIAN REGISTER, Apr. 27, 1850, at 68;
Connecticut in 1855, see New Marriage Law in Connecticut, GERMAN REFORMED MESSENGER,
Jan. 17, 1855, at 4230; New Hampshire in 1854, see The Marriage Laws of New Hampshire,
HOMEJOURNAL, Oct. 21, 1854, at 4.
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regulation of marriage that had traditionally only involved bigamy,
incest, and publication.'76 Later, as discussed above, states added
requirements such as waiting times and blood tests for syphilis and
other venereal diseases.177
F Obsolescence of Marriage Procedure 'sJustifications
Ironically, in modern times, the state has retreated from virtually
all of the regulatory purposes marriage procedure once served.
Most prominently, the states (of course) no longer prohibit inter-
racial marriage. Most states have dropped, or decreased, venereal
disease testing, as a societal consensus has moved towards individu-
al control of this information."' Indeed, a few states' brief efforts to
require AIDS testing before marriage ended in the face of public
resistance.'79 Going back even further, marriage licenses hardly
constitute publicity or notice as marriage records are notoriously
difficult to search. Even the paternalistic goal of preventing rash
marriages has evaporated.'8o While the Las Vegas wedding is hardly
the norm, waiting periods have decreased to the point of vanishing
as we discuss in Section II above.
IV. DEFINING MARRIAGE'S REGULATORY GOALS AND MAKING
PROCEDURE TO FURTHER THEM
So far this Article has shown that existing regulatory structures
for marriage formation are largely historical artifacts and serve
few, if any, cognizable regulatory purposes. We next will identify
regulatory purposes and procedures that make sense in the mod-
ern context. However, before proper procedures can be
established, we must develop a working definition of marriage
with a specified purpose. We argue marriage is best described as a
176. NANCY CoTr, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 28-33
(2000); see also PASCOE, supra note 19.
177. PASCOE, supra note 19, at 138.
178. ALLAN M. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN
THE UNITED STATES 143-46 (1987) (describing states' requirement of a blood test for vene-
real disease starting with Connecticut in 1935); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
179. Illinois and Louisiana required AIDS testing for marriage licenses, but these re-
quirements have all been repealed. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, 1 5/204 Historical &
Statutory Note (Smith-Hurd 1993) (repealed 1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:230-:231
(West 1991) (repealed 1988); see also Isabel Wilkerson, Illinoisans Fault Prenuptial Tests for
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1988, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/16/
us/illinoisans-fault-prenuptial-tests-for-aids.html
180. See supra notes 64, 73 (describing evolution away from waiting periods).
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hybrid of enabling regulation to create a legal relationship and
status-a status that carries value in and of itself. Two sets of bene-
fits emerge from such a description:
(i) Marriage as an enabling regulation that allows indi-
viduals to form a legal relationship between
themselves, their children (if any), and their prop-
erty. Both individuals and the state have an interest
in ensuring that the relationship is entered into
with ample disclosure and information about the
partners.
(ii) Marriage as a status good, itself, that the state
and/or civil society confer. Perhaps responding to a
deep anthropological need, people want the status
created by public recognition of their long-term
sexual and romantic relationships.'8 '
This conception of marriage's benefits, in turn, leads to two
clear regulatory goals. First, if marriage is an enabling regulation it
should be rendered as convenient and efficient as corporate law.
This suggests that regulation should aim towards flexibility, particu-
larly through the offering of marriage to those across borders. Just
as with corporate law, jurisdictional competition will emerge once
individuals are allowed to choose among the laws of different ju-
risdictions. In addition, more complete information will lead to
more efficient contracting. States can offer services, such as a
means for couples to agree to effective disclosure to one another.
With incorporation, state filing offices provide some basic monitor-
ing, such as to assure there is no duplication of a trade name.
Second, viewing marriage as a status good suggests that the sta-
tus of marriage, as a benefit and good in and of itself, should be
more widely and efficiently distributed. This is another benefit of
cross-border marriage authorization. As will be discussed in the last
section, offerings of a status good across state lines, consistent with
federalism, is a model for progressing toward a goal of marriage
equity worth considering as an alternative to the Supreme Court's
mandating one form of equity-nationwide equal marriage rights
for same-sex couples.
This section defends our concept of marriage and examines a
modernized marriage procedure to further the regulatory goals
marriage suggests.
181. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 30.
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A. Marriage as Enabling Regulation and Status Good
Conventional legal wisdom vacillates in its classification of mar-
riage between (i) a government-regulated and -created status1 82 and
(ii) a self-regulating contractual or religious agreement." Neither
classification is complete, and one cannot reduce marriage into
either. Marriage is not just a contract. It will always have status
aspects because the state will never allow private contractual regu-
lation of certain matters, including children (especially upon
divorce), tax treatment, inheritance and intestacy, support obliga-
tions, and default rules for the division of property in the case of
divorce. Courts are uniform in their refusal to enforce prenuptials
that purport to regulate how children will be treated upon di-
vorce. 1 4 Similarly, most states place a limit on the enforceability of
182. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1542 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "status" as "[a] person's
legal condition, whether personal or proprietary; the sum total of a person's legal rights,
duties, liabilities, and other legal relations, or any particular group of them separately con-
sidered <the status of a landowner>."); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 CARDozo L.
REv. 2081, 2096 (2005) ("My conclusion is that the 'right to marry' entails both some right
of intimate association in the private sphere and (more relevantly for present purposes) an
individual right of access to the official institution of marriage so long as the state provides that institu-
tion. With respect to the access right, the best analogy is to the right to vote."); Richard A.
Wilson, The State of The Law of Protecting and Securing the Rights of Same-Sex Partners in Illinois
Without Benefit of Statutory Rights Accorded Heterosexual Couples, 38 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 323, 329
(2007) ("Derived from the status as a social and legal construct, not a bargained-for, express-
ly enumerated transaction, the rights of married persons and the legal protections-the
'benefits and burdens'-of marriage are neither inherently nor in fact a matter of contract.
Neither are they set forth in any detail in a given state's marriage statutes."). See generally
MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006); ERIN A.
O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAw MARKET 161 (2009) ("We typically think of mar-
riage as a status .. . . But from a legal perspective, marriage also can be viewed as a kind of
standard form contract.").
183. Legal scholars have advocated treating marriage as purely or largely a contractual
relationship for decades. See Daniel A. Crane, A "Judeo-Christian" Argument for Privatizing
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1221, 1222-23 (2006); Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey Evans Stake,
Liing the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 464-65 (1998)
("[C]ouples should be authorized to legally define their own marriages. Many arguments
have been made, and have gained general acceptance, that courts should enforce agree-
ments as to the terms of divorce, at least regarding the division of property. Courts should
be authorized to also enforce private agreements regarding grounds for divorce and terms
of an ongoing marriage."); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 209-11 (1982) (arguing for "the desirability of a
new pattern of intimate relations law in which contractual tools and processes would play a
critical role ... consciously deciding where to apply contract principles with enthusiasm,
where to discard them as inappropriate, and where to tailor them to the special context of
marriage"); Sunstein, supra note 182, at 2115 ("As a matter of law, at least, people can gen-
erally leave the marital form whenever they wish to do so. Increasingly, marriage resembles a
contract, dissoluble at the will of the parties, rather than a permanent status.").
184. Jonathan E. Fields, Forbidden Provisions in Prenuptial Agreements: Legal and Practical
Considerations for the Matrimonial Lawyer, 21 J. Am. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAw. 413, 426-27
(2008) ("Not surprisingly, provisions in a prenuptial agreement purporting to affect the
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prenuptial agreements that purport to regulate certain inalienable
rights or intrude too greatly upon partners' autonomy while mar-
ried.185
Beyond the fact that the state governs key parts of the marriage
relationship, placing the legal relationship outside of contract,
proponents of state withdrawal from marriage and its submergence
into contract misapprehend the long history and value of marriage
as a benefit, even status good, which the state must help to pro-
vide.' Marriage responds to individuals' need for a public
recognition of their unions, and not for mere contractual obliga-
tion.' Market behavior supports this claim. Fewer than five
percent of couples spend the money or expend the efforts to ob-
tain prenuptial agreements to specify or alter their legal rights
under the law.'" In contrast, people value ceremony and the status
of marriage. If lay people valued marriage as a contract, they would
more often use pre-nuptial agreements, which modify marriage's
"pre-packaged" legal contract or status.'88 If individuals lack the in-
terest to modify the terms of legal marriage, individuals either are
completely pleased with the terms (arguably unlikely) or value
rights of the parties' children are void as against public policy. Provisions limiting child sup-
port are unenforceable, as are provisions that seek to dictate the custody of a child or a
parenting schedule unless the disposition is also in the best interests of the child.").
185. Id. at 430 (noting that courts and federal law refuse to enforce prenuptial agree-
ments that waive rights to ERISA protected retirement funds, other survivor benefits, or
temporary alimony, purport to regulate conduct during the marriage, require children to be
brought up in a certain religion, and limit bases for divorce).
186. Sunstein, supra note 182, at 2116 ("But private arrangements, religious and other-
wise, might provide as much protection of children as official marriage does; and the
protection of children might be ensured directly, through requirements of care and sup-
port, rather than through marriage in its current form."); see also Estin, supra note 81, at 479
(noting that the laws in the areas of contracts, public benefits, immigration, bankruptcy, and
tax are built upon commonly held marriage norms and commenting that "[p]rivatizing
marriage would require construction of new rules, a new official law, in each of these differ-
ent frameworks").
187. Lois Smith Brady, Stephen Davis and Jeffrey Busch, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2009, at S17
("In August 2004, Mr. Busch and Mr. Davis were among a group of same-sex couples who
sued Connecticut for the right to marry, a case the group won in October 2008. 'Marriage is
so much more than a collection of rights and privileges,' Mr. Busch said. 'Nobody says, 'Oh,
I want to civil union you."").
188. ARLENE G. DUBIN, PRENUPS FOR LOVERS: A ROMANTIc GUIDE TO PRENUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS 15 (2001) ("Anecdotal evidence suggests that 5 to 10 percent of couples ...
now enter into prenups."); Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics-of Prenuptial
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REv. 887, 891 (1997) ("Of marrying couples, approximately 5 per-
cent (about 50,000) sign prenuptials each year."); Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few
Prenuptial Agreements? 2 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and
Business Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper No. 436, 2003), available at http://
1sr.nellco.org/harvard olin/436/.
189. "Like corporate status, civil marriage today serves as an off-the-rack rule." Case, su-
pra note 165, at 1781 (2005); see Mahar, supra note 188.
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marriage for reasons other than legal. The average couple (or their
families) spends over $20,000 on their marriage ceremony and
party.'90 A cross-sectional study of the five bridal magazines with
highest circulation reveals an emphasis on ceremony with no arti-
cle concerning marriage's legal import."" Consistent with its role of
status good, marriage and its rituals retain their social and personal
significance even though there is considerably less social pressure
to marry than in the past. Society now accepts that matters typically
associated exclusively within a sanctioned marriage, such as child-
rearing and sexual relations, may be done outside of marriage. 9 2
Conversely, marriage can never be, and never has been, merely a
religious institution.'9 3 The state will always have an interest in basic
human relationships because they implicate children, taxation,
and other basic concerns regardless of whether the union is civil or
religious. As the historical discussion above shows, English law
treated clandestine marriage differently from official church mar-
riage, thereby creating distinct secular and religious definitions of
marriage. Keeping the state involved in defining marriage protects
women from entering marriages that lack legal substance and over
which religions exercise the only say as to the obligations of the
parties.'9 4 Similarly, it protects uneducated or unwary women from
relying on false understandings of their rights or obligations that
social groups might encourage.
Finally, we reject viewing marriage exclusively as a status regulat-
ed by the state within its borders for three reasons. First, marriage
statutes have evolved toward a relatively standard, though un-
innovative, format,'9 6 suggesting that states now have no capacity or
190. See Wedding Budget vs. Real Wedding Cost, COST OF WEDDING, http://
www.costofwedding.com/ (last visited February 24, 2011) ("US couples spend [on average]
$24,066 for their wedding. However, the majority of couples spend between $18,050 and
$30,083. This does not include cost for a honeymoon or engagement ring.").
191. Study on file with authors.
192. We expand upon this argument in Section III.
193. See Kmiec Proposes End of Legally Recognized Marriage, CATHOLIC NEws SERVICE (May
28, 2009, 4:41 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/kmiec._proposesend of_
legally-recognizedmarriage/ ("The net effect of that, would be to turn over-quite appro-
priately, it seems to me, the concept of marriage to churches and a church understanding."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
194. Estin, supra note 81, at 514 (discussing the French rule on religious and civil mar-
riages).
195. Id.
196. Grossman, supra note 18, at 434 ("While non-uniform marriage laws and the
conflicts they engender are not new, the most significant disagreements among states about
marriage law were resolved by the last third of the twentieth century. Thus, the recent
introduction of same-sex marriage in a single state has disrupted a period of relative calm.");
Id. at 442 ("The differences that had been so pronounced in the first half of the twentieth
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incentive to innovate, experiment, or afford to marriage law im-
provement of the sort associated with modem regulation. The
current regime, so to speak, has little to recommend it other than a
preference for status quo. State laws' remarkable consistency has
been well-documented, with most states moving towards similarity
in licensing, waiting period, and solemnization requirements.'9
Second, marriage as a state regulatory franchise conflicts with
marriage as an agreement, initiated and controlled by those who
are getting married-a view fundamental to Anglo-American mat-
rimonial law, a subject we discuss in Section III. While status
advocates will often describe marriage as a "consented to legal sta-
tus," that misses an important point. As we discuss below, the state,
particularly in the United States, historically never had a monopoly
in defining that status, as discrete local and religious communities
often assumed that role.'9" If marriage is a legal status, it is a
strange, de-centered one in which religion, custom, the need for
personal autonomy,'" and various state jurisdictions interact to de-
fine its contours.200
Third, we maintain that under federalism, the nation can enjoy
the state-conferred benefit of the status value of official marriage in
all places. This can occur even as the debate concerning same-sex
marriage continues in the political and judicial realms. Under a
federalist system, there need not be one state in any one geographic
area conferring the marriage status.
century all but disappeared in the second half ... A snapshot of state marriage laws circa
1995 reveals a remarkably uniform system.").
197. For a discussion of the basic procedures found in all state marriage law, see supra
Section II.
198. See supra Sections III.D and II1.E (discussing colonies' and later states' reception
and development of marriage law).
199. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE SixTH act 5, sc. 5
("Marriage is a matter of more worth/Then to be dealt in by attomeyship."). The insistence
by same-sex couples of the marital nature of their relationship has led five states to accept an
expanded definition of marriage. The broadening of the definition has been driven by indi-
vidual demands for autonomy.
200. We agree with Ann Laquer Estin that in matters of marriage and family law, "state
law and legal institutions have only a limited degree of control over society, and do not nec-
essarily dominate or displace other social systems. Another [question] is that individuals may
be simultaneously subject to different systems of rules, and these systems may not be coordi-
nated or hierarchically arranged." Estin, supra note 81, at 454. Estin continues, though,
saying that "official law functions as a gatekeeping tool to define the shape of both family
life and the broader social and political community." Id. at 455. Estin thoroughly reviews the
fact that the rules for marital exit are a critical benefit of state sanctioning. Id at 470-73.
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B. Marriage Formation Law: Regulatory Regime to Distribute a Status
Good and Enable Certain Legal Relationships
Neither contract nor status perfectly captures the nature of mar-
riage. As the preceding subsection argues, marriage has two sets of
benefits. A state's marriage licensing must respond to both. As for
the first set of benefits, marriage is an enabling regulation creating
a legal relationship between two people, their children (if any),
and their property. As for the second set of benefits, marriage is a
status good that the state and/or civil society confer, a point that
legal scholarship has not fully recognized. The genesis of desires
for marriage deepened by official ceremony and sanction seems
both obscure and profound.o1 While the frustration and difficulties
inherent to any long-term relationship are hard to bear, the benefit
of "sticking with it" outweigh these disutilities. People, therefore,
marry to make it difficult to end their long-term relationships on
the basis of relatively short-lived unhappiness.20 2 An official mar-
riage ceremony may be part of the psychology of making marriage
worthwhile and later violation of the public, official, or "sacred"
marriage vows part of the disutility of ending a long-term relation-
ship. Relatedly, the expense and trouble of a wedding can serve as
credible signal for sincere desires and intention to observe mar-
riage vows.
Given the imperfectly understood, yet undeniable, way people
value the social sanctioning of marriage, perhaps the best way to
understand it is as a certain type of status good, like the receipt of a
government medal or award. A status good is simply a good the
demand for which is inspired by social rather than by utilitarian
product attributes.202 Rather than provide utility in the more nor-
mal sense of nourishment, shelter, adornment, pleasure, or
possession, status goods provide prestige204 and enhanced personal
meaning. Marriage is a status good that requires state sanction
and/or religion as necessary parts of its "social attributes."
201. Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size Fits to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2001).
202. DAVID LAIBSON, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. EcON. 443, 444
(1997).
203. Roger Mason, Measuring the Demand for Status Goods: An Evaluation of MeansEnd
Chains and Laddering, in 2 EUROPEAN ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 78-81 (Flemming
Hansen ed., 1995).
204. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods, 103 Q.J.
ECON. 79,81 (1988).
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1. Convenience and Disclosure in Marriage Formation
Consider competition among states in creating enabling regula-
tions. Looking at precedent for a genuinely competitive market in
law that maximizes individual control, yet maintains the value of
state sanction, we would point to certain federalist features of cor-
porate law and the efficiencies they create. A corporation
organized in one state comes into being in another upon the de-
livery through in-state intermediaries of pro forma filings.205
Because corporate promoters can avail themselves of a state's laws
without domiciling in such state or establishing even a temporary
presence, states strive to provide the best legal mechanisms for
formation, often using new technology. Convenience and lower
cost are critical factors that businesses value and states work to pro-
vide. While some writers have noted that marriage laws might form
a market for law,206 and some have offered an analogy of marriage
to business forms,207 commentators and states have overlooked the
potential for states to fashion their legal mechanism of marriage
for consumption by those located, and remaining, outside their
borders.200
205. Indeed, Vermont, a pioneer in innovative marriage, is an innovator in corporate
form, permitting for the first time in the nation corporations that exist only in cyberspace,
without requiring such companies to have a physical location for such essential corporate
functions as board meetings or process service. See Wagner James Au, Vermont OKs the Crea-
tion of Virtual Corporations, GicAOM (June 17, 2008, 12:30 PM), http://gigaom.com/2008
/06/17 /vermont-oks-the-creation-of-virtual-corporations/. Further, corporations have be-
gun to develop permissions developed in state codes to hold "virtual shareholder meetings,"
in which shareholders may attend electronically and "ask questions and cast their votes live
via the internet," using innovative technology developed for the purpose. Rick E. Hansen,
Corporate Governance: Revisiting Virtual Stockholder Meetings, Insights, 23 CoRP. & SEC. L. ADvI-
SOR (2009).
206. F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 561; see also O'HAR-A & RIBSTEIN, supra note 182, at 161 ("[Mlarriage also can be
viewed as a kind of standard form contract, much like a corporation ... ."). O'Hara and
Ribstein explore the notion of the "market in marriage law." Id. at 166-68. They realize the
efficiency benefits in allowing individuals to choose the applicable law. Id. at 171 ("[T]he
benefits of a market for state marriage law are at least as clear as the benefits of a law market
in other contexts . .. ."). O'Hara & Ribstein, however, do not realize the possibility (and
benefits) of cross-border marriage law. Id. at 168 ("[S]tates are competing only to attract
residents willing to remain in the state . . . .").
207. Martha E. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001).
208. Some commentators see the marriage geographic monopoly as a way states can
impose costs on couples, thereby discouraging imprudent marriages. See O'Hara & Ribstein,
supra note 132, at 1208 ("States use marriage law to define the types of relationships they
want to encourage through subsidies, as distinguished from those they wish to discourage
both by not conferring subsidies and even by criminal penalties. Accordingly, a state's liberal
marriage law might help the local tourist trade but impose costs where the couple returns to
live. There is also a somewhat greater justification for state paternalism given the emotional
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We wish to stress that we see marriage law bearing only a family
resemblance to other enabling regulations," like corporate codes.
We do not argue that a marriage "is" a corporation. Just as we find
uninformative the debate over whether marriage is a status or a
contract, we see no need to taxonomize marriage. What we do ar-
gue, however, is that marriage as a type of legal ordering can
borrow elements of corporation law, in particular, its enabling of
individuals to access and utilize state legal systems to facilitate their
business purposes, with or without physical presence within the
state.210
The implicit competition among states could exist in numerous
parameters. First, it could provide more efficient marriage for-
mation procedures. As mentioned above, the states have developed
archaic requirements that continue through the centuries with on-
ly occasional improvement.21' With competition, states could
provide more attractive waiting periods, identity background
checks, and, yes, marriage fees.
Indeed, myriad procedures could be envisioned to fulfill a host
of needs. States could require that both parties be present in one
location, perhaps with a local notary. Or they can permit marriages
of any two people anywhere on the globe, subject to whatever pre-
cautions they choose. Or they could outsource marriage to private
firms that could provide the efficient and convenient service within
nature of the decision, its significance to the married couple, and the absence of efficient
markets to discipline choice of marriage partners."). They have not taken the next step-
recognizing the efficiencies that could be gained from eliminating the geographic monopo-
ly while, at the same time, through internet communications and information gathering,
potentially further "paternalistic" state goals.
209. Corporate codes made a transition starting in the early twentieth century from be-
ing regulatory, based on a concession theory of the corporation, to an enabling philosophy.
See Stanley A. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433, 433
(1968) (explaining that "[d]uring the past half century, the state corporation statute has in
large measure been transformed from a device to control, restrict, and govern the corpora-
tions chartered under it into an enabling act granting to enterprisers the relatively
unrestricted opportunity to devise the type of entity which they desire"); Elvin R. Latty, Why
Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965).
210. Kaplan, supra note 209, at 433-37 (reviewing trends, and commentary on them,
toward incorporation of larger enterprises in states where the connection is nominal).
211. There may be a public choice explanation for this outcome. Public choice theorists
view politics and the legislative process as "an exchange model." See STEARNS ET AL., PUBLIC
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAw 16 (2009). Because there are few repeat play-
ers in marriage and no cadre of lawyers who work in marriage formation law, there is no
demand to create an innovative, responsive market in marriage formation regulation. To
illustrate, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, founded in 1962 and highly re-
garded by family law attorneys, has more than 1600 members in fifty states. Though their
website serves as a resource across the whole array of family law problems, it has no treat-
ment at all of marriage licensing procedures or barriers to access. See AAML,
http://www.aaml.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
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parameters set by the state. Taking advantage of these experiments,
individuals could choose the legal forms of marriage they like best
rather than be forced to use those rooted in the jurisdiction in
which they are physically present. Internet teleconferencing and
other modem communications technology allow individuals to
have a transformed "legal experience "2 of marriage, just as these
technologies have transformed corporate deal closings. These
changes in the way we live (and live the law) render such remote
marriage ceremonies far more emotionally effective (and affective)
than earlier efforts at distance marriage, like proxy and letter mar-
riage, making e-marriage a desirable alternative to solemnization
invariably tied to a physical place.1
Some might fear a "race to the bottom," in which states with the
most lax procedures would dominate. In other words, everyone will
use distance marriage to get a Las Vegas wedding. States will permit
predatory marriage to vulnerable "lonely hearts." This is probably
not a serious concern. Existing marriage formation rules, as we dis-
cuss in Section I, already offer minimal procedures that do not
coherently forward any regulatory goal. Many states, like Ohio, of-
fer marriage without waiting periods. Marriage formation is already
at the bottom in many places; Las Vegas-type marriage is there for
the taking.
Instead, competition in marriage procedure might produce the
opposite effect, i.e., a race to the top. 14 To avoid damaging the in-
212. See, e.g., Lynn Ashby, Astronaut Wedding, H TEXAs ONLINE (Sept. 1, 2003),
http://htexas.com/edit/astronaut-wedding. That a marriage ceremony, without the export-
able legal incidents, is valued is demonstrated by the space wedding conducted under Texas
law between an American citizen in Houston and a Russian cosmonaut in space. Id. The
marriage was valid in Texas when solemnized but was not valid in Russia. Id. The ceremony
took place with the bride in a white gown, with music and flowers, and the groom present
from space on a drop screen in a NASA conference room. Id. It was reported as "a standard
American wedding." Id. Nonetheless, the marriage was to be re-solemnized in Russia in a
Russian Orthodox wedding after the cosmonaut's return to Earth. Id.; see also Live Internet
Weddings Changes the Way Guests Attend Weddings, ERELEASES.COM (March 13, 2007), http://
www.ereleases.com/pr/live-internet-weddings-changes-the-way-guests-attend-weddings-9405
(noting that the Starwood Hotel in Hawaii recognized the need for telecasting of wedding
ceremonies to guests who could not attend); id. ("[Plerhaps the most valuable service Live
Internet Weddings provides is not professional videography or even a live wedding Webcast.
Perhaps its value is more intangible, more easily measured in shared memories made possi-
ble through the marriage of art and technology."); VIVA LAS VEGAS WEDDING CHAPEL,
http://www.vivalasvegasweddings.com/live-internet weddings.htm, (last visited February
22, 2009) ("Your friends and family can view your nuptials from any location worldwide, live,
on our Viva Las Vegas Wedding Chapel Streaming Web-Cams ... . Our live Internet wedding
streams are broadcast free!").
213. Didion, supra note 64.
214. For a useful summary of the debate in corporate law between "race to the bottom"
and "race to the top" interpretations of competitive federalism, see LARRY RIBSTEIN &
BRUCE KOBAYASHI, THE EcoNoMics OF FEDERALISM 12 (2007).
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tegrity and reputation of their legal systems, distance marriage
adopter states would have to establish a couple's identity-and
could do so in a more rigorous way because physical appearance at
a clerk's office would be impossible. Rather, electronic identity ver-
ification could require background checks, including credit
histories, arrest records, and the like. State governments, perhaps
working with private contractors subject to tight regulation and
control, are uniquely positioned to provide this information cheap-
ly and accurately.
Individuals would have an interest in such checks. Indeed, it is
amazing that the law requires greater disclosure for a publicly
traded security one purchases than for the person one marries.
Information about credit history and history of violent acts, for
example, could greatly decrease transaction costs in marriage
selection. Serious signaling problems impede the voluntary disclo-
sure of information in romantic relationships. This problem is a
factor in the limited use of prenuptial agreements. "Merely
providing the opportunity to people to write prenuptial agree-
ments is not an effective way of allowing such customization
because ... engaged couples are concerned that bringing up the
idea of a postnuptial agreement will send a distrustful and damag-
ing signal to their prospective spouse."2 " Asking for pre-nuptial
agreements signals a low commitment to the marriage and little
trust.
Just as with prenuptial agreements, asking for verification con-
cerning credit history or arrest record signals a lack of trust. If such
disclosures were a standard option as part of an identity verifica-
tion process, the signaling problem would decrease. An express
desire to pick a state that had no disclosure requirements, or to
avoid a disclosure option in the state being used, may signal un-
trustworthiness-a fact that might induce a race to the top with
innovations in marriage disclosure. Distance marriage constitutes a
process that furthers both a couple's interest in improved and mod-
ernized marriage formation law and the state's interest in helping
couples prevent imprudent marriages.2
215. Sean Hannon William, Sticky Expectations: Responses To Persistent Over-Optimism In
Marriage, Employment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 733 (2009) (citing Mahar, supra note 188, at
2).
216. Sunstein, supra note 182, at 2116 ("But private arrangements, religious and other-
wise, might provide as much protection of children as official marriage does; and the
protection of children might be ensured directly, through requirements of care and sup-
port, rather than through marriage in its current form."); see also Estin, supra note 81, at 479
(noting that the laws in the areas of contracts, public benefits, immigration, bankruptcy, and
tax are built upon commonly held marriage norms and commenting that "[p]rivatizing
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Most practically, states could compete on marriage fees. To the
degree states have a local "monopoly" power over marriage, they
can extract economic rents, i.e., prices that exceed marginal cost.
Governments can extract these rents directly in the form of fees or
in procedural requirements and like inconveniences.21' A competi-
tive market, without geographically imposed friction on using it,
would lower fees and lead to more convenient forms of marriage
solemnization. Assuming that state authorization of a marriage has
a lower marginal cost, competition could cut costs significantly.
This price-cutting might be likely to occur because distance mar-
riage offers the opportunity for states to capture an international
market in marriage." One could envision that states could offer
marriage authorization at very low price but earn significant reve-
nue by attracting an enormous global market.21' At the same time,
the "price" for "rare" types of marriage, like same-sex marriage,
could be quite high-perhaps capped by the cost of traveling to a
distant location to get married.
2. Modernized Marriage, Choice of Law, and Contract's Limits
Distance marriage raises a natural question. How do those who
marry in a distant jurisdiction get divorced by a distant jurisdic-
tion? Under the typical rule, divorce is a proceeding in rem. The
marriage is "present" in the jurisdiction in which at least one
marriage would require construction of new rules, a new official law, in each of these differ-
ent frameworks").
217. Some states may limit fees to cost.
218. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the popularity, before its re-
vision, of Montana double proxy statute, particularly among individuals from the Middle
East).
219. The effect on immigration status would be a matter for the federal government,
which already has special rules for how marriages of U.S. citizens to non-citizens are treated
for immigration. See Abrams, supra note 61. To show distance marriage's revenue potential
consider the following numbers. According to the Center for Disease Control, Minnesota
performed 11,424 marriages during the first six months of 2007. See CTR. DISEASE CONTROL,
BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS: PROVISIONAL DATA FOR JUNE 2007, at 5
(2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_12.pdf. Multiplied
by $110 per license, the Minnesota fee, see Sheri Stritof & Bob Stritof, Applyingfor a Marnage
License in Minnesota, Aaour.com, http://marriage.about.com/cs/marriagelicenses/
p/minnesota.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011), marriage licenses revenue would be
$1,256,640 for that period.
Distance marriage opens an entirely different revenue potential. Montana provides proxy
marriage, through private marriage services, which charge approximately $500. See Barry,
supra note 114. While the market for same-sex marriage is potentially enormous, Minnesota
could double its revenue from licensing if it were to authorize a mere 628 e-marriages and
charge this current market rate.
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member of the couple resides. 220 This jurisdiction's divorce law ap-
plies to the marriage regardless of what jurisdiction authorized the
marriage's formation. Typically, e-marriage should raise no prob-
lem. People commonly get divorced in jurisdictions in which they
have not married. It makes no difference whether they traveled to
another jurisdiction to get married or received their authorization
remotely, as with e-marriage.
The problem emerges when the jurisdiction in which the couple
resides does not recognize the marriage, i.e., a couple that lives in
Michigan but seeks a divorce dissolving their Vermont same-sex
marriage. When a couple in a same-sex marriage asks a court to
divorce them in a jurisdiction that fails to recognize such marriage,
or when there is a mini-DOMA statute that prohibits recognition,22
courts have applied three main approaches. First, they recognize
the marriage as a marriage, at least for the purpose of the divorce,
and can then divide the property.222 Second, they recognize the
marriage as contract and divide the property.223 Third, they refuse
to recognize any relationship. In the latter two possibilities,
courts would award custody of children on the rules established for
children of unmarried couples. In fact, marriage does not entirely
drive custody questions, where there are combinations of variations
from the standard expectation of a married couple, nearly always
of opposite sex, both of whom are biologically related to a child of
the marriage.
Same-sex couples residing in a jurisdiction that does not recog-
nize their union must return to the authorizing jurisdiction if their
domicile states treat their relationship as purely contractual or re-
fuse to recognize it. Returning to the authorizing state presents
problems. Both members of the couples may not want to do so.
And, many states have residency requirements, typically around six
225
months for divorce. People are, therefore, stuck in a legal limbo.
220. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942).
221. Koppelman, supra note 38, at 265.
222. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.YS.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Are Same-Sex Marriages
Performed in Other Jurisdictions Valid in New Mexico?, N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. 11-01 (2011),
available at http://www.nmag.gov/Opinions/Opinion.aspx?OpD=1131#CompleteOpinion.
223. Koppelman, supra note 38, at 271 (explaining that the correct view, in states that
do not allow same-sex marriage but do not have mini-DOMAs that purport to void contrac-
tual rights associated with a migratory same-sex marriage, is to treat the marriage as though
it were an ordinary contract).
224. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 958 (R-I. 2007).
225. D.C. CODE § 16-902 (2001) (stating that one party must reside in D.C. for at least
six months immediately preceding the time of filing); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 592 (2002)
(stating that one party must reside in Vermont for at least six months at the time of filing).
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Distance marriage would accelerate one problem that the sever-
al states' inconsistent treatment of marriage has created. On the
other hand, distance marriage points to a solution that clarifies the
nature of marriage as contract and legal status. We propose that all
e-marriages require a prenuptial agreement in which the couple not
only agree upon the disposition of property but also submit to the
jurisdiction of the authorizing state in the event the domiciliary
state refused to recognize their union for divorce purposes. The
distance marriage authorizing state could therefore easily adminis-
ter the divorce using the prenuptial agreement as a guide. We
leave to later analysis the possible impediments to receiving a di-
vorce recognized by other states if the state granting the divorce is
not the domicile of at least one of the parties.
Requiring a prenuptial agreement reduces divorce's transac-
tion costs.226 It also renders marriage more of a contract, and less
of status. Individuals would be freer to craft unions that fit their
choices. Further, mandatory prenuptial agreements also eliminate
the signaling problem that many argue have hindered their wide-
spread use. Internet resources could be used to provide couples
with several on-line options and pull down menus. These would
be government-provided model contracts that would provide
simple rules. Couples would, of course, be free to use their own
counsel to select more complicated contracts.
Custody of children in any same-sex divorce-or any divorce in-
volving a marriage not universally recognized-presents yet
another problem. Custody of children cannot be settled by con-
tract. Rather, the domiciliary state has an interest in how children
within its borders are treated, a concern that trumps any contrac-
tual arrangements. E-marriage, however, does not create any
tremendous problems (other than those that exist now). Marriage
has some role to play in custody decisions but is not the sole factor
in the legal treatment of custody matters. Concededly, it is often
true that each of the parties to a marriage has parental rights with
respect to the same child. Further, it may be that the jurisdiction
does not recognize second-parent adoption so that the members of
a non-marital couple would have some difficulty in being recog-
nized as legal parents if it is not the case that both parents are
biologically related to the child. Nonetheless, child custody is a
function of a whole array of factors not arising in any simple way
from marital status. So the non-marital status of the couple would
not necessarily cause the state to treat them any differently from a
226. Michael Hanlon & Michael Hanson, Transaction Costs and Divorce (Feb. 1, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548640.
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married couple, and certainly not from a married couple who are
not both biologically related to the child.
3. Status Goods: Distance Marriage, Same-sex Marriage,
and Covenant Marriages
The "efficient" distribution of a status good is a tricky, even con-
tradictory, goal. Society at large, by definition, confers status goods.
Marriage, in particular, is conferred by the state as proxy for socie-
ty. Marriage qua status good requires a sort of monopoly-in any
given society, there can only be one (the state), or at best a handful
of institutions (properly authorized officials or delegates), that can
confer such goods. In that sense, it does not make sense to speak
about efficient allocations of the marriage status. Only the state
can provide the benefit.
On the other hand, federalism provides an alternate account of
the nature of a state-conferred status good. Namely, the psychic
benefits of receiving a marriage from another sister state, even if
the couples' home state fails to recognize such a marriage, are real.
Same-sex couples travel to states like Vermont and Massachusetts to
marry.2 2 ' They would not do so if there were no benefit in doing so.
Of course, the status or psychological benefits of a same-sex
marriage in a jurisdiction that refuses to recognize such union are
no doubt less than a recognized union-i.e., a Vermont same-sex
marriage has less psychological benefit than a Florida destination
marriage in a state such as Michigan that does not recognize same-
sex marriage. But, because same-sex Michigan couples do, in fact,
travel to Vermont to marry, there is unquestionably some value.
Reducing the transaction costs can only be a net benefit.
Federalism combined with e-marriage might spur competition
in the substance of marriage. Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana al-
ready provide covenant marriage. As discussed above, these
marriages create much higher barriers to divorce.2 2 ' They offer a
different type of marriage, and distance marriage would make such
ceremonies more readily available. The recent proliferation of dif-
ferent types of marriage suggests that there might be markets for
different types of marriage. Distance marriage might allow this di-
versity to flourish-meeting the "demand" for marriage more
efficiently than the current one-size-fits-all regulatory approach.
Distance marriage could energize a stagnant regulatory regime. It
227. See sources cited supra note 5.
228. See supra note 29.
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could also open a process for other innovations in family forms
offered by states.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING LEGAL
LANDSCAPE FOR MARRIAGE
A. General Overview of Goals of a Regime for Marriage Accessibility
Two developments in federal litigation are salient for our pro-
posal, and, more generally, for an assessment of the ideal approach
to shaping marriage procedure and policy in the twenty-first centu-
ry. In 2010, U.S. District Judge Walker ruled that California's
Proposition 8, which restricted the definition of marriage to ex-
clude same-sex marriage, violates the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and interferes with the fundamental
right to marry, derived from the substantive meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment.23 0 A few months earlier, U.S. District Judge
Tauro of Massachusetts ruled that section 3 of the Defense of Mar-
riage Act 31 violates due process of law under the Fifth Amendment
by severely undermining the equality of treatment of couples mar-
ried under the law of a state.3 The California case imposes the
equality norm on state marriage substance, thus enmeshing federal
courts in shaping basic marriage law traditionally controlled by
states. In so doing, it short circuits the process by which federalism
has over time encouraged the spread of liberalized marriage rules
from state to state-which, as Grossman has written, is the long-
standing pattern."
Our proposal offers a less traumatic path to greater access to
marriage for same-sex couples than does the California holding,
while providing general modernizing benefits to marriage proce-
dure. The constitutional invalidation of the part of DOMA that
withholds federal recognition of same-sex marriages, combined
with our proposal, would allow some same-sex couples to use those
jurisdictions recognizing their unions to obtain federal benefits
(depending on how thorough is the destructive effect of the non-
recognition by the domicile state at the time of the marriage). At
the same time, it would avoid imposing marriage law by the Su-
preme Court on all the states, allowing individual states to take the
229. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
230. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
231. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
232. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010).
233. Grossman, supra note 18, at 342.
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lead to modernize marriage and maintain their historic role in de-
fining marriage. Thus, as opposed to Judge Walker's decision,
Judge Tauro's case holding DOMA unconstitutional on equality
grounds is not a maximalist holding2 3 but a holding that fits our
federal system well by demanding that the federal government give
the same recognition to the marriages authorized by Massachu-
setts, Vermont, and other states as it does to those the most
conservative states formalize.
The insistent application by federal courts to all states of the
equality norm, undiluted, accelerates social change in states highly
resistant to it and fuels high octane conflict.2 ' The adoption of dis-
tance marriage gradually introduces same-sex marriage ceremonies
in resistant states and allows a constitutional dialogue without a
violent backlash.
No less than Justice Ruth Ginsburg has recognized the im-
portance of giving states a role at central points in constitutional
evolution. In her famous essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,3  she laments the overarching
effect of Roe v. Wade. She points out that states were already evolv-
ing towards more flexible laws about abortion when the decision
came down. The decision, in effect, mobilized opposition and
sparked a backlash, ironically leading to less liberal abortion laws.
Justice Bader Ginsburg writes:
234. The phrase, "maximalist holding" was used by Dale Carpenter in analyzing the de-
cision of the federal district court declaring California Proposition 8 unconstitutional. See
Dale Carpenter, A Maximalist Decision, Raising the Stakes, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 4,
2010, 7:54 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/04/a-maximalist-decision-raising-the-stakes/.
Cass Sunstein has advocated "judicial minimalism," especially in connection with federal
court supervision of marriage law. He recently wrote about the limits ofjudicial minimalism,
and noted that, "If reciprocity and mutual respect are desirable, it follows that public offi-
cials or judges, perhaps even more than ordinary people, should not challenge their fellow
citizens' deepest and most defining commitments, at least if those commitments are reason-
able and if there is no need for them to do so." See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond judicial
Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REv. 825, 832-33 (2008). Putting aside the reasonableness or not of
opposition to same-sex marriage, there is some basis to say that the "genius of federalism"
makes "no need" for federal courts to mandate an undiluted equality norm for all state mar-
riage laws before allowing federalism to spread the equality norms through the workings of
state sovereignty.
235. The failure to retain three Iowa Supreme Justices who voted to extend equal mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples under Iowa law suggests the intensity of conflict associated
with judicial resolution of the same-sex marriage debate in favor of marriage rights. See A.G.
Sulzberger, Ouster of lowa judges Send Message to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, November 3, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html (describing the removal vote as
"unprecedented," thus indicating the passions aroused by court imposition of same-sex
marriage).
236. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
'Wade, 63 N. C. L. REv. 375 (1985).
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Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The sweep and
detail of the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-
life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and
state legislatures. In place of the trend 'toward liberalization
of abortion statutes [among the several states]' noted in Roe,
legislatures adopted measures aimed at minimizing the im-
pact of the 1973 rulings . . .. Roe, I believe, would have been
more acceptable as a judicial decision if it had not gone be-
yond a ruling on the extreme statute before the Court. The
political process was moving in the early 1970s, not swiftly
enough for advocates of quick, complete change, but majori-
tarian institutions were listening and acting. Heavy-handed
judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to
have provoked, not resolved, conflict. 7
Nationally imposed same-sex marriage runs the same risks that
Justice Ginsburg described.238 In contrast, modernized marriage
procedures offer similar, or identical, benefits to couples but would
moderate the pace of change. Same-sex couples can already go to
another state to enter into the status under the law of another
jurisdiction. With the ending of DOMA, adoption of distance
marriage statutes by a state or states with same-sex marriage
would close the loop, giving same-sex couples a very large share
of marriage dignitary status and economic benefits, while allow-
ing states to find their own preferred state-based policy process
for accommodating the trend to recognizing same-sex marriage.
B. Legislative Issues
How might a regime of distance marriage within the United
States look, taking into account both the values to be preserved in
current marriage procedures and the possibility for improvements
237. Id. at 381, 385-86.
238. Courts use various methods to avoid, or delay, addressing contentious issues. There
is a body of writing on underenforced Constitutional norms, which suggests a division be-
tween.the -meaning of the Constitution and the decision rules judges apply. A useful review
of such writings is in Kermit Roosevelt II, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARv. L. REv.
F. 193 (2006) (Replying to Richard H. Fallon,Jr.,Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitu-
tional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006)); see also Lawrence Sager, Material Rights,
Underenforcement, and the Adjudication Thesis, 90 B.U. L. REv. 579, 580 (2010) (referring to
"the idea that a conscientious constitutional court will on some occasions stop short of fully
enforcing the Constitution because of particular features of the judicial process, but that
these institutional limitations on the judiciary do not mark the substantive boundaries of the
Constitution").
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and modernization? The following lists some regulatory goals such
a regime might further:
1. Make marriage readily accessible for those unable
to be present together at a ceremony in the state
solemnizing the marriage and for couples who are
excluded from marriage by otherjurisdictions;
2. Assure that each member of the couple is entering
the marriage freely and without pressure or coer-
cion or deception;
3. Assure that each member of the couple is in fact
free to marry based on current marital status and
age and, for states that deny marriage to same-sex
couples, gender;
4. Render the ceremony readily available to friends
and family without regard to their ability to be pre-
sent with either member of the couple;
5. Provide opportunities for innovation by private
businesses delivering remote marriage ceremonies;
6. Take advantage of efficiencies to reduce cost to the
average couple wishing to use the e-marriage pro-
cedure;
7. Allow new room for the state to earn fees from
funds available as a result of less costly marital me-
chanics;
8. Offer the possibility of heightened protections
against imprudent marriages based on only casual
acquaintance, subject to couple preference;
9. Design a national electronic system for accurate
records of existing marriages and for the compila-
tion of useful data for the study of marital patterns
and trends; and
10. Make necessary recitals asserting that the compli-
ance with the state's distance procedure constitutes
constructive presence in the state.
In addition to the elements any statute could have, states could
consider protections extending beyond current law, to protect
parties against a coerced or fraudulent marriage, a significant
problem in immigration. This is an area in which states could
experiment to outsource some components of the marriage
procedure, allowing certified internet counselors to create and
offer protocols for validation of marital bona fides that exceed the
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absent protocols in the current nominally regulatory but de facto
"de-regulated" licensing regime.' Internet marriage procedure
could recover aspects of the original concerns animating the
publication of banns.240 While a general marriage statute might
face constitutional barriers if it created onerous counseling
requirements that could result in a complete denial to a couple of
a license, the extension of internet convenience could be
conditioned on agreement by the parties, or offer them the option,
to undergo more extensive confirmation of their identity, their
personal knowledge of one another, the existence or not of any
side agreements or inducements, and the lack of any coercion.
Like Louisiana's and Arizona's covenant marriage, such "gold-
plated" marriage requirements could signal a higher degree of
commitment. Some newlyweds might find this ability to show their
spouse greater commitment valuable to overcome uncertainty on
the spouse's or his or her family's part. As these requirements im-
pose cost in terms of time and money, they could be viewed as
"credible signals" that reliably track actors' sincerity. And they
might well help prevent unwise marriages of relative strangers.
Legislative approaches would depend on the number of couples
and the circumstances in which a state wishes to aid with a more
accessible marriage procedure. We do not draft here model stat-
utes to address matters such as the standardization of distance
statutes for purposes of data collection, or federal revisions to im-
migration law that cede to sound state law the supervision of
marriages by U.S. citizens to non-citizens. All of these subjects are
ripe for innovation that strengthens state administration of mar-
riage law and procedures.24' Distance marriage statutes require
elaboration of the underlying protections, forms of screening, and
involvement by officials. Statutes affecting marriage procedure
could best be developed through legislative hearings inviting input
from a wide array of experts, including family law scholars, web
experts on business models for the internet, and couples who have
experienced unusual challenges in complying with standard mar-
riage procedures. Choices would need to be made about limits on
eligibility connected with citizenship status, the exact form that the
ceremonial formalization would take, and the possibilities of con-
239. Abrams, supra note 61, at 1626-28.
240. See RICHMOND & HALL, supra note 15, at 32 (explaining how banns have become
abandoned because "the old system leaned heavily upon publicity, but this was under a set-
tled, small-town organization of society in which publicity was genuinely effective" but
advocating advance notice periods to allow diligence by clerks and second thoughts by ap-
plicants, with concern to avoid consummation of inappropriate unions).
241. See Abrams, supra note 61, at 1626-28.
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sortiums among states to reduce administrative expense and pro-
vide for standard recordkeeping. The possibilities for improved
state marriage law are almost limitless, given their current condi-
tion of languishing in nineteenth century thinking.
CONCLUSION
Distance marriage will facilitate access to a legal relationship
laden with symbolism, duration in relationships entered into with
awareness of the weight of the commitment, care in confirming
the identity and even offering aid to the parties to probe the
background and motives of a partner, and public celebration of
the significance of a marriage in the spaces where social mean-
ings are shared. Our proposal allows couples to define their own
community, freed from the contingency of geography and the
historical accident of state borders. Although we call in part upon
the power of internet communications, we do not suggest that
marriages need be no more than a click of a mouse (although they
could be if states and couples so desire). We recognize that people
like the physicality of the ceremony: the flowers, the smells, the
cake, the suits and dresses, the priest or other state officiant, the
crying relatives, the kiss. States and individuals could easily choose
the level of ritual and regulation they wish.
Building upon our federalist design, states could write statutes
that reflect and express the values particular states embrace. Peo-
ple could choose those states to authorize their weddings that best
match their own values. Same-sex couples could seek the states that
recognize their unions. Individuals who live in a state that has mar-
riage laws with which they disagree could seek to authorize their
weddings from other states. In this way, distance marriage expands
the expressive value of the marriage ceremony.
We recognize that, for some gay couples, the power of the mar-
riage ceremony is hearing their own state say their marriage is
legitimate. For such couples, the ideal picture of their marriage
involves the convergence of the status, the recognition, and the
location. While our proposal would increase the number of out-of-
state marriages, it would do nothing on its own to make the cou-
ple's home state recognize the marriage.
For some, this limitation would be a bone of contention. But our
proposal allows what the economists would say is the second best
solution. To the degree marriage's utility is a function of the size
and depth of the community recognizing it for couples excluded
from that recognition, distance marriage is not optimal but it
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could offer significant satisfaction and happiness nonetheless. In
response to the culture wars, distance marriage offers a provisional
cease-fire and an evolutionary process, deploying the neglected
genius of federalism to spread marriage liberalization. Couples in
marriage-hostile states could have it without persuading the most
socially conservative adherents of Biblical claims about marriage.
The federal courts could vindicate equality norms without entering
the domain of state regulation of family forms, an area in which
one can anticipate a coming period in which states respond to the
demand both for the status good of marriage and the availability of
alternative family forms. If the federal courts say that same-sex
marriage is constitutionally mandated by the Equal Protection
clause, there is some real prospect of introducing into state control
over marriage a norm that may be difficult to confine to a logical
ending point in demands for marriage access. If the states can
gradually accept that same-sex couples should share in marriage,
through applying state constitutional logic or legislative choice
based on state norms, the federal courts could limit their supervi-
sion of the matter to manageable limits that reinforce existing
understandings of federalism. Federal courts can discipline Con-
gressional enactments, keeping a bright line between the domain
of state law in family matters and the domain of federal law, which
appropriately defers to state definitions of family forms. The norms
of equality-equal access to marriage status and ceremony-can be
achieved prudently and with some dispatch through the full use by
states of their existing sovereign authority over marriage.
Our review of marriage history shows that marriage authoriza-
tion has been remarkably flexible and not tied to territorial
jurisdiction, only calcifying in recent years. Distance marriage an-
swers contemporary needs for convenience, defusing cultural
conflict over marriage and allowing couples choices that partially
recover forgotten regulatory goals for informed decision-making in
marriage formation. Consonant with our values, history, and con-
stitutional structure, distance marriage can recover lost goals of
marriage law, enrich traditions, and remove needless barriers to
marriage for many couples.
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